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 SCOTTSBORO 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of America‘s most infamous legal episodes began on March 25, 
1931.  Nine black youths from Georgia and Tennessee were accused of raping 
two white women on a freight train in northern Alabama.  In hastily arranged 
trials, eight of them received death sentences.  Their appeals, retrials, and 
subsequent legal proceedings riveted the attention of the nation and the world 
and ultimately produced two Supreme Court rulings in their favor and nearly 
twenty years of legal wrangling. 
Known to history as Scottsboro, this episode teaches several lessons 
relevant to students of American constitutional law and history.  The 
Scottsboro Cases illuminate why the modern revolution in American criminal 
procedure began mainly with cases involving black criminal defendants from 
the South.  The episode also reveals how Supreme Court interventions in 
southern race cases tended to incite political backlashes that undermined 
implementation of the Court‘s decisions—thus making Scottsboro an 
important forerunner of Brown v. Board of Education.
1
  The competition 
between the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and the International Labor Defense (ILD) for the right to represent 
the Scottsboro defendants on appeal illustrates competing perspectives on the 
use of law as a method of social reform—a debate that reverberates to the 
 
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor, Harvard Law School.  This Article was published in conjunction 
with my delivery of the Boden Lecture at Marquette Law School in September 2009.  I am grateful to 
Dean Joseph Kearney for extending that invitation.  Thanks to Bill Stuntz for comments on an earlier 
draft and to Carrie DeCell, Kelsey Israel-Trummel, Jessica King, Gabe Mendel, Asieh Narriman, 
Sheri Shepherd, and Sarah Teich for research assistance.  The research for this Article was greatly 
facilitated by the remarkable reference librarians at the University of Virginia School of Law, where I 
had the privilege to serve as a faculty member for over twenty years; special thanks are due to Cathy 
Palombi.  Anyone working on Scottsboro must acknowledge the extraordinary contributions to our 
understanding of that episode made by Dan Carter and James Goodman.  An earlier, abbreviated 
version of this Article was published as Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court 
Confronts ―Legal Lynchings,‖ in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT LEADING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 1–44 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2005).  
My footnoting practices in this Article combine those used by historians and those of law 
professors.  In general, I have combined the sources relevant to a particular paragraph in a single 
footnote at the end of that paragraph.  However, for quotations and for other sentences containing 
specific details, I have adhered to conventional law review practices. 
1. 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954); see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 385–442 (2004). 
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present day.
2
  The limited impact of the Supreme Court rulings in Scottsboro 
on the southern criminal justice system sheds light on another great debate in 
American constitutional law and theory: the capacity of the Supreme Court to 
compel social change.
3
  Finally, the Scottsboro litigation illustrates not only 
some of the indirect benefits of litigation as a method of organizing social 
protest,
4
 but also the intangible costs generated by Court victories that fail to 
appreciably change oppressive social practices.
5
 
II.  THE STORY OF SCOTTSBORO 
A.  A Fateful Train Ride 
The freight train left Chattanooga for Memphis at 10:20 a.m. on March 25, 
1931.  Thirty minutes after it had pulled out of Stevenson, Alabama, the 
stationmaster there saw a group of white hoboes walking along the train tracks 
back toward the station.  They told him that several black youths had thrown 
them off the train after a fight.  The stationmaster telephoned ahead to the next 
stop, Scottsboro, but the train had already passed through.  It was finally 
stopped at Paint Rock, where a sheriff‘s posse discovered nine black youngsters 
and, to everyone‘s surprise, two young white women dressed in men‘s overalls.6 
The nine blacks, known to history as the Scottsboro boys, ranged in age 
from thirteen to twenty.  Five of them were from Georgia, though they 
claimed not to know one another.  The other four did know one another; they 
were from Chattanooga, Tennessee.  All of the nine were vagrants, and most 
of them were illiterate. 
Twenty minutes after the train had been stopped, one of the women, Ruby 
 
2. See, e.g., Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on 
LGBT Rights, 43 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 151 (2009); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, 
and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the 
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the 
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).  
3. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF 
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 192–209 (1978); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1st ed. 1991); Bradley C. Canon, The Supreme 
Court and Policy Reform: The Hollow Hope Revisited, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE 
COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 215 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & 
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 333–55 (1993); STEPHEN 
L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: SOME PERSPECTIVES (1970). 
4. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 214–22 
(discussing indirect benefits from law reform activity); KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL 
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 93–95, 162–67, 284–86, 365–69, 463–68; MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS 
AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 10, 56–57, 279 
(1994) (discussing indirect benefits of reform litigation activity).  
5. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 95–96, 282–84. 
6. DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 3–5 (rev. ed. 1979); 
JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO 3–4 (1994). 
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Bates, called over a posse member and told him that she and her companion, 
Victoria Price, had been gang-raped by the blacks.  The boys were 
immediately arrested and taken to the Scottsboro jail.  As the sheriff sent the 
women to two local doctors for medical examinations, news of the alleged 
attacks spread.  By day‘s end, a crowd of several hundred people had gathered 
outside of the jail, demanding that the ―niggers‖ be turned over for lynching. 7  
Sheriff M.L. Wann pleaded with the mob to allow the law to take its course 
and threatened to shoot anyone who rushed the jail.  He also telephoned the 
governor for assistance, and by 11:00 p.m., twenty-five armed guardsmen 
were on their way to Scottsboro.  To ensure the boys‘ safety, they were moved 
to a sturdier jail in nearby Etowah.  The local circuit judge, Alfred E. 
Hawkins, convened a special session of the grand jury to indict them; local 
citizens complained of the five-day delay.  One local newspaper remarked, ―It 
is best for the county that these things be disposed of in a speedy manner as it 
gives no excuse for people taking the law into their own hands.‖8 
A decade or two earlier, black men charged with raping white women 
under similar circumstances might well have been executed without trial.  
Lynchings in the South peaked in the late 1880s and early 1890s, when well 
over a hundred were reported annually and in some years over two hundred.  
Most lynchings occurred in response to allegations of crime—usually murder 
or rape—though occasionally the alleged ―offense‖ was as minor as breach of 
racial etiquette or general uppityness.  Prior to World War I, lynchings 
typically enjoyed the support of local communities; efforts to prosecute even 
known lynchers were rare, and convictions were virtually nonexistent.
9
 
By 1930, however, the number of reported lynchings had declined 
dramatically—from an average of 187.5 per year in the 1890s to 16.8 in the 
later years of the 1920s.
10
  This decline was attributable to many factors, 
including the possibility of federal anti-lynching legislation, the diminishing 
insularity of the South, more professional law enforcement, and better 
 
7. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 6–8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
8. Id. at 6–9, 16–17 n.11 (quoting the PROGRESSIVE AGE (Scottsboro, Ala.), Apr. 2, 1931) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 21–22.  
9. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 105; KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 1, at 118–19; see generally W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: 
GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880–1930 (1993); GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE 
CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH, 1890–1940, at 199–227 (1998); LEON F. LITWACK, 
TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 280–325 (1998); NEIL R. 
MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 224–56 (1989); 
ARTHUR F. RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING (1933); UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING 
IN THE SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997) (discussing lynching in relation to racial violence, 
its regional and cultural contexts, and its legacy).  
10. RAPER, TRAGEDY OF LYNCHING, supra note 9, at 25, 46–47. 
382 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:379 
education.
11
  But the decline in lynchings probably also depended on their 
replacement with speedy trials that reliably produced guilty verdicts, death 
sentences, and rapid executions.
12
  Some jurisdictions actually enacted laws 
designed to prevent lynchings by providing for special terms of court to 
convene within days of alleged rapes and other incendiary crimes.
13
  In many 
instances, law enforcement officers explicitly promised would-be lynch mobs 
that black defendants would be quickly tried and executed if the mob desisted, 
and prosecutors appealed to juries to convict in order to reward mobs for good 
behavior and thus encourage similar restraint in the future.
14
 
In such cases, guilt or innocence usually mattered little.  As one white 
southerner candidly remarked in 1933, ―If a white woman is prepared to 
swear that a Negro either raped or attempted to rape her, we see to it that the 
Negro is executed.‖15  Prevailing racial norms did not permit white jurors to 
believe a black man‘s word over that of a white woman; prevailing gender 
norms did not allow defense counsel to closely interrogate a white woman 
about allegations involving sex.  As one contemporary southern newspaper 
observed, the honor of a white woman was more important than the life of a 
black man.
16
  And because most southern white men believed that black males 
secretly lusted after ―their‖ women, they generally found such rape allegations 
credible.  Congressman George Huddleston of Birmingham, whom the 
NAACP initially approached to represent the Scottsboro boys on appeal, 
repulsed the overtures, observing that they had been ―found riding on the 
same freight car with two white women, and that‘s enough for me!‖17  
Scottsboro whites told an investigator from the American Civil Liberties 
 
11. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 565 (1944); GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW 
SOUTH 1913–1945, at 174, 554 (1967); Todd E. Lewis, Mob Justice in the ―American Congo‖: 
―Judge Lynch‖ in Arkansas During the Decade After World War I, 52 ARK. HIST. Q. 156, 179–84 
(1993).   
12. On these ―legal lynchings,‖ see MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY, supra note 9, at 206–17; 
George C. Wright, By the Book: The Legal Executions of Kentucky Blacks, in UNDER SENTENCE OF 
DEATH, supra note 9, at 250–70. 
13. See, e.g., Bettis v. State, 261 S.W. 46, 47 (Ark. 1924); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 298 (1940); LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS 1874–1900, 
at 253 (1971). 
14. See, e.g., RICHARD C. CORTNER, A ―SCOTTSBORO‖ CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND BROWN V. MISSISSIPPI 3–4, 8 (1986); Anne S. Emanuel, Lynching and the Law in 
Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter in the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle , 5 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 215, 228 (1996).  
15. John Gould Fletcher, Letter to the Editor, Is This the Voice of the South?, 137 NATION 734, 
734 (1933). 
16. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 134. 
17. Excerpt from a Confidential Report on the Scottsboro Cases (May 7, 1931), microformed 
on Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, pt. 6, reel 2, frames 
893–94 (August Meier ed., Univ. Publ‘ns of Am. 1982) [hereinafter NAACP Papers]. 
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Union (ACLU) that, ―We white people just couldn‘t afford to let these niggers 
off because of the effect it would have on other niggers.‖18 
The Scottsboro defendants received precisely the sort of ―justice‖ that 
often prevailed in trials that substituted for lynchings.  Both local newspapers 
treated the defendants as obviously guilty even before the trial.  The 
hometown newspaper of the alleged victims, the Huntsville Daily Times, 
―described the rapes as the most atrocious ever recorded in this part of the 
country, a wholesale debauching of society.‖19  Judge Hawkins tried to assign 
all seven members of the Scottsboro bar to represent the defendants, but all 
but one of them declined.  That one was Milo Moody, nearly seventy years 
old and later described by one investigator as ―a doddering, extremely 
unreliable, senile individual who is losing whatever ability he once had.‖20 
The trials began on April 6, just twelve days after the train incident.  A 
crowd estimated at five to ten thousand gathered outside the courthouse, 
which was protected by national guardsmen wielding machine guns.  Hawkins 
appointed as trial counsel a Tennessee lawyer, Stephen R. Roddy, who had 
been sent to Scottsboro by the defendants‘ families to look after their 
interests.  Roddy was an alcoholic, and one observer reported that ―he could 
scarcely walk straight‖ that morning.21  When Roddy objected to his 
appointment on the grounds that he was unprepared and unfamiliar with 
Alabama law, Hawkins appointed Moody, the local septuagenarian, to assist 
him.  Roddy was permitted less than half an hour with his clients before the 
trial began.  Defense counsel moved for a change of venue based on the 
inflammatory newspaper coverage and the attempted lynching of the 
defendants.  But Sheriff Wann now denied that the defendants had been 
threatened, and Judge Hawkins denied the motion.
22
 
The state sought the death penalty against eight of the nine defendants—
all but the one who was identified as being only thirteen years old.  The nine 
were tried in four groups, beginning with Clarence Norris and Charley 
Weems.  Victoria Price was the main prosecution witness, and she testified 
that the black youths had thrown the white boys off the train and then gang-
raped her and Bates.  According to one secondhand account, Price testified 
 
18. Hollace Ransdell, Report on the Scottsboro Case (May 27, 1931) [hereinafter Ransdell 
Report], microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frame 175. 
19. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 20 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
20. Memorandum from Mrs. Hollace Ransdall [sic] on Visit to National Office on May 18, 
1931 (May 19, 1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frame 27; 
CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 17–18; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, 
at 26.  
21. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 21–22 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
22. Id. at 19–24. 
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―with such gusto, snap and wise-cracks, that the courtroom was often in a roar 
of laughter.‖23 
Judge Hawkins blocked defense counsel‘s efforts to elicit admissions that 
the women were prostitutes and that they had had sexual intercourse with their 
boyfriends the night before the train incident, which could have explained the 
semen found in their vaginas during medical examinations.  Testimony 
provided by the examining doctors raised serious doubts as to whether the 
girls had been raped: They were not hysterical when examined, nor had they 
incurred any serious physical injuries.  Moreover, Price had so little semen in 
her vagina that a sequential rape by six men, as she alleged, was highly 
improbable.  Finally, the sperm found in the women was non-motile, which 
virtually ruled out the possibility of intercourse within the preceding few 
hours.  In their testimony, the two women also provided inconsistent accounts 
of various details of the incident, such as whether they had spoken with the 
white boys on the train and how long the interracial fracas had lasted.  One 
man present when the train was stopped testified that he had not heard Price 
make any rape allegations.
24
 
However, the admission by Norris on cross-examination that the women 
had been raped by all of the other eight defendants, though not by him, 
severely undercut his defense.  (It later came out that Sheriff Wann had 
warned Norris that he would be killed if he did not admit that the girls had 
been raped.)  Defense counsel prodded the illiterate and confused Norris to 
change his story, but he held firm.  The defense called no witnesses and made 
no closing argument.
25
 
While the jury deliberated on the fate of Norris and Weems, the trial of 
Haywood Patterson began.  When the first jury returned to the courtroom to 
announce guilty verdicts and death sentences, crowds in and out of the 
courthouse erupted with delight.  According to defense lawyer Roddy, 
―[i]nstantly, a wild and thunderous roar went up from the audience and was 
heard by those in the Court House yard where thousands took up the 
demonstration and carried it on for fifteen or twenty minutes.‖26  Even though 
Patterson‘s jury heard this commotion, Judge Hawkins refused to declare a 
mistrial.
27
 
The prosecution‘s case grew stronger with each trial, as previously 
 
23. Ransdell Report, supra note 18, at frame 181; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 
6, at 24–26. 
24. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 26–30. 
25. Id. at 33–35. 
26. Letter from Stephen R. Roddy, Attorney, to the Friends and Relatives of the Nine Negro 
Boys Charged with Rape, in Jackson County, Alabama (Apr. 11, 1931), microformed on NAACP 
Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frame 627. 
27. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 35–38.  
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unhelpful witnesses were dropped and the alleged victims improved their 
stories with each recounting.  Within a five-minute span on the witness stand, 
Patterson contradicted himself as to whether he had seen the girls being raped 
or indeed had seen them on the train at all.  Several of the other defendants 
also testified inconsistently.  After less than twenty-five minutes of 
deliberation, the jury convicted Patterson and sentenced him to death.
28
 
Five of the defendants were prosecuted together in a third trial.  The 
state‘s case against them was even weaker because these defendants did not 
incriminate each other on cross-examination, the women were less certain in 
identifying them as the rapists, and one of the defendants was nearly blind 
while another had such a severe case of venereal disease that raping a woman 
would have been very difficult.  The jury nonetheless returned five more 
death sentences.  Judge Hawkins declared a mistrial in the case of the last 
defendant, Roy Wright, when the jury could not agree on whether to sentence 
the thirteen-year-old to life imprisonment or to death—a sentence the 
prosecution had not even sought.  None of the four trials lasted more than a 
few hours.
29
 
B.  Representation on Appeal 
The Communist Party quickly realized the potential for propaganda and 
fund-raising afforded by the Scottsboro episode, which it saw as the Sacco 
and Vanzetti case of the 1930s.  Communists denounced the trials as ―legal 
lynchings‖ and assailed the ―parasite landlords and capitalist classes of the 
South.‖30  Less radical voices also protested this ―barbarous penalty‖ imposed 
on eight black youngsters.
31
  By contrast, the NAACP, which was generally 
reluctant to intervene in criminal cases unless reasonably certain that the 
defendants were innocent, was slow to act.  The NAACP‘s hesitation enabled 
the ILD, the legal arm of the Communist Party, to secure the defendants‘ 
consent to its representing them.
32
 
Stung by criticism from supporters for its dilatory response and 
discovering that ―public interest is so deep that we cannot afford not to be in 
the case,‖ NAACP leaders aggressively challenged the ILD for control of the 
boys‘ appeals.33  The NAACP convinced some black leaders in Chattanooga, 
 
28. Id. at 38–43; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 14–15. 
29. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 42–48. 
30. Id. at 49 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
31. Id. at 50 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
32. Id. at 49–60; GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 7–8, 25–29. 
33. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Bob & Herbert (May 3, 1931), 
microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frame 829; see also Letter from Roy 
Wilkins, Assistant Secretary, NAACP, to Walter White, Secretary, NAACP (May 7, 1931), 
microformed on id., frame 889 (noting that while the NAACP had been silent on the Scottsboro case, 
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which was home to several of the defendants, that communist involvement 
would be a millstone around the boys‘ necks, and the defendants were 
persuaded to retract their consent to ILD representation.  The ILD responded 
by publicly attacking the NAACP as ―[b]ourgeois [r]eformists‖ and ―secret 
allies of the lynchers‖ who would help ―lead the boys to the electric chair.‖34  
The communists declared that the boys could be saved only by mass protest, 
not by appeals to the ruling class.  They ridiculed the NAACP for its 
willingness to ―kiss the rope that hangs their brothers, if only the rope is 
blessed by a ruling class judge,‖ and they accused the association generally of 
ignoring the interests of the black masses.
35
 
In response, the NAACP accused the communists of using the case for 
their own selfish advantage and warned that their incendiary rhetoric would 
harm the defendants‘ chances of winning reversal on appeal or securing a 
commutation of their sentences from the governor.  Walter White, the general 
secretary of the NAACP, told the mother of one of the boys, Eugene 
Williams, that ―the odds against her son were terrific at best—that when Red 
prejudice was added to Black, she would practically insure her boy‘s 
execution by remaining tied up with the Communists.‖36  White even accused 
the communists of calculating that ―the boys dead will be worth more for 
propaganda purposes than alive.‖37  By contrast, the NAACP‘s strategy on 
appeal would be to hire an eminent white lawyer from the South who would 
avoid publicity and try to win reversal or commutation on narrow legal 
grounds.
38
 
 
the ILD and the Communist Party had been publicizing it and ―generally whooping it up‖ and that 
this was causing  ―no little embarrassment to the Association‖). 
34. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 56–57, 61–62 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
35. Id. at 67 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Letter from William 
Patterson, Secretary, ILD, to NAACP (June 30, 1933), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 
17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frames 459–72 (arguing that the freedom of the Scottsboro boys could be won 
―only by rousing the Negro masses in alliance with the white workers to a relentless struggle against 
the whole system of national oppression of the Negro peop le,‖ and attacking the NAACP for trying 
to block such alliances while placing excessive faith in the courts).  
36. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Bob & Herbert, supra note 33, at frame 
826. 
37. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Messrs. Fort, Beddow & Ray (Aug. 19, 
1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 4, frame 146; see also Letter 
from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Roy Wilkins, Assistant Secretary, NAACP (May 13, 
1931), microformed on id., at reel 2, frames 973–75 (noting that the NAACP had cause to believe 
that ―some of the Communists [felt] that if the boys [were] electrocuted after at least a semblance of 
legal action to save them [had] been made, it [would have been] even more valuable for the 
Communists in their appeal to Negroes for support‖).   
38. Murder from Afar, PHILA. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1931, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra 
note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 351; CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 69–72; see also Letter 
from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Ludwell ―Lud‖ Denny (Apr. 29, 1931), microformed on 
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NAACP leaders were torn between wanting not to jeopardize the 
defendants‘ chances of winning the support of moderate whites in the South 
and wishing not to alienate those of its members who demanded a vociferous 
condemnation of the white South for its willingness to execute the defendants 
on dubious evidence.  By distancing itself from the ILD, the NAACP 
alienated the many blacks who saw little reason to repudiate the communists‘ 
assistance, which they saw as ―sincere and wholehearted.‖39  The editor of one 
black newspaper observed that the NAACP had ―outlived its usefulness if it 
now feels that fighting the spread of communism is more important than 
fighting white Southerners who will lynch, massacre, and slaughter and 
expect to get away with it.‖40  Another black editor accused the NAACP of 
having an ―Uncle Tom attitude‖ in this case.41  Yet Walter White was 
convinced that it would be ―suicidal‖ for the NAACP ―to be tied up in any 
way with that outfit of lunatics [the communists].‖42  Most black newspaper 
editors saw the battle between the NAACP and the ILD as ―deplorable‖43 and 
a ―sad spectacle,‖44 and one observed that ―we have too few friends to have 
the quarrel as to which we shall lend a helping hand in any given case.‖45 
After months of repeatedly changing their minds over the choice of legal 
representative, by the end of 1931 all of the defendants had settled on the ILD, 
partly because of the NAACP‘s occasionally condescending attitude toward 
them and their parents.  For example, one NAACP official, William Pickens, 
referred to some of the boys‘ parents as ―the densest and dumbest animals it 
has yet been my privilege to meet‖—a statement that the ILD ensured the 
parents heard about.
46
  The communists also sent small monthly checks to the 
 
NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 2, frames 748–49 (noting that this case would have been 
―difficult enough to handle under normal circumstances, but the tactics of the Communists have 
inflamed feeling against the boys to fever pitch‖ and observing that the only way to save the boys‘ 
lives was to find a lawyer, ―preferably an Alabamian, whose standing is such as to help mobilize 
effectively the considerable sentiment which, we are informed, exists in Alabama among white 
people of the decent sort, that the boys are innocent‖). 
39. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 69 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
40. Id. at 96 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
41. The Conservative N.A.A.C.P, OKLA. CITY BLACK DISPATCH, May 14, 1931, microformed 
on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 118. 
42. Letter from Walter White to Bob & Herbert, supra note 33, at frame 828. 
43. Editorial, This We Regret, CAL. NEWS, Jan. 7, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 469. 
44. An Offensive Defense, CAROLINA TIMES, Jan. 9, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 507. 
45. The Reds at Scottsboro, AFRO–AM. (Balt.), Jan. 9, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 489; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 85–90.   
46. Letter from William Pickens, Field Secretary, NAACP, to Walter White, Secretary, NAACP 
(June 6, 1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frames 355–57. 
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defendants‘ families and treated their parents with kindness and respect.47 
In a final effort to win back control of the cases, the NAACP persuaded 
Clarence Darrow to participate in the appeals.
48
  Not wishing to be perceived 
as rejecting assistance from the nation‘s most eminent criminal defense 
lawyer, the ILD professed eagerness to have Darrow‘s help.  But the 
organization insisted that Darrow sever his connections with the NAACP and 
take orders from the ILD.  Confronted with such an ultimatum, Darrow and 
the NAACP withdrew from the case.  One black newspaper predicted that the 
consequence of Darrow‘s withdrawal ―is almost surely to be murder in 
Scottsboro‖ and warned that the defendants‘ ―innocent blood will be a 
crimson stain on the [ILD].‖49 
Because communists generally viewed courts as simply ―instruments 
of . . . class oppression,‖ they did not place much faith in litigation.50  Rather, 
they favored ―revolutionary mass action outside of courts and bourgeois 
legislative bodies.‖51  Communists believed that the Scottsboro cases could 
educate the masses and increase party membership, especially among blacks.  
Throughout the spring and summer of 1931, communists organized large 
demonstrations in the North—often featuring the defendants‘ mothers—to 
protest the boys‘ treatment and to petition Governor Benjamin Meeks Miller 
of Alabama and President Herbert Hoover for redress.  In Dresden, Germany, 
communists threw rocks through the windows of the American consulate and 
 
47. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 91.  
48. Letter from Walter White, Secretary, NAACP, to Clarence Darrow, Attorney (Aug. 31, 
1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 4, frame 259 (stating that he had 
hoped it would have been unnecessary to ask Darrow to enter the Scottsboro case, but that with the 
white lawyers from Birmingham withdrawing, ―we are frankly up against what is probably the most 
delicate and difficult situation of our history‖); see also Letter from Walter White, Secretary, 
NAACP, to Willie Robinson [sic] (Sept. 11, 1931), microformed on id., frame 268 (expressing great 
pleasure in telling Roberson that the NAACP had succeeded in retaining Darrow, ―the greatest 
criminal lawyer in the United States if not in the world‖).  
49. Murder in Scottsboro, PHILA. TRIB., Jan. 7, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra 
note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 464; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 97–103; 
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 37–38. 
50. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 138 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Appeal to the American Workers for Effective Mass Action to Save the Scottsboro 
Boys, DAILY WORKER (N.Y.), Jan. 20, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, 
reel 8, frame 532 [hereinafter Appeal to the American Workers] (asserting that the ―main function‖ of 
courts ―is to administer law made specifically as a means of persecuting the Negroes‖).  
51. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 138 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Appeal to the American Workers, supra note 50 (―[T]he hope for the nine 
Scottsboro victims of American lynch democracy, does not lie in the chambers of the Supreme Court 
of Alabama.  It lies with the masses of American workers, who in vigorous protests and 
demonstrations will show their determination to end lynch law and to stop Negro persecution. . . .  
Confidence in the courts cannot bring justice.  Only confidence in the might and power of the 
organized efforts of the American working class is the method of obtaining the freedom of these 
innocent boys.‖). 
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condemned the ―bloody lynching of our Negro co-workers‖—a scene that was 
repeated elsewhere in Europe that summer.
52
  Even in Tallapoosa County, 
Alabama, communists used the ―Scottsboro lynch verdict‖ to organize black 
sharecroppers into a union demanding higher wages and the release of the 
boys; whites responded with violence and murder.
53
 
By the summer of 1931, Governor Miller was receiving thousands of 
abusive letters from around the world.  One typical protest condemned ―the 
brutal slave drivers of Alabama acting through a Ku Klux Klan judge and jury 
inflamed by race hatred . . . to send nine innocent children to the electric 
chair.‖54  ILD attacks on white Alabamians as ―lynchers‖ were reprinted in 
local newspapers, increasing resentment toward the Scottsboro boys.  Local 
whites grew more defensive, insisting that the defendants had been given ―as 
fair a trial as they could have gotten in any court in the world.‖55  The 
Commission on Interracial Cooperation, which often supported the appeals of 
southern blacks convicted in obviously unfair trials, refused to support the 
Scottsboro defendants because of hostile public opinion.  The governor‘s 
secretary explained that Scottsboro had become ―a white elephant‖ for Miller 
and that the ILD‘s inflammatory statements had ―tied his hands.‖56  One white 
constituent warned the governor not to let any ―threat or demand from dirty 
yankees or damn communists from the North and throughout the world . . . 
sway you.‖57  Judge Hawkins confided to defense lawyer Roddy that he did 
not ―really think the boys should be put to death, but . . . the Communists are 
more of an issue than are the FACTS of the case.‖58  One white Alabamian 
captured the view of many, observing that ―I might have been for acquittin‘ 
them at the first trial, but now after all this stink‘s been raised, we‘ve got to 
 
52. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 142 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Fight for Doomed Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1931, at 9 (noting that 
communists protesting Scottsboro were responsible for recent mob attacks on the American 
consulates at Dresden and Leipzig, Germany); Communist Uprising Is Police Idea, BIRMINGHAM 
AGE-HERALD, June 18, 1931, at 1 (noting that youth in Dresden threw bottles through the windows 
of the American consulate containing messages stating, ―Down with the bloody lynch law on our 
Negro comrades‖). 
53. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 121–30, 138–46, 167; Labor Defense Charges 
―Murder,‖ N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1931, at 30; Volleys Disperse Alabama Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 1931, at 30.  
54. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 145 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
55. Id. at 112 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
56. Letter from William Pickens, Field Secretary, NAACP, to Walter White, Secretary, 
NAACP (June 1, 1931), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 3, frame 252.  
57. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 136 n.90 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
58. Id. at 119 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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hang ‘em.‖59 
C.  Alabama Supreme Court 
It was in this climate that the Scottsboro verdicts were appealed to the 
Alabama Supreme Court.  In recent decades, state supreme courts in the South 
had become somewhat more protective of the procedural rights of black 
criminal defendants, frequently reversing convictions, even in cases of murder 
or rape, on grounds such as prejudicial racial statements by prosecutors, the 
refusal of trial judges to change venue or grant defense counsel adequate time 
to prepare, and the use of coerced confessions.
60
  To be sure, criminal justice 
for southern blacks remained grossly unequal: Blacks still could not serve on 
southern juries; black lawyers could not command fair hearings in southern 
courtrooms; black witnesses were treated as less credible than white 
witnesses; and the death penalty was never imposed on white rapists or on 
men who raped black women.  Still, some progress had been made.  Yet in 
explosive cases that generated outside criticism of the South or that were 
otherwise perceived to threaten white supremacy, southern courts regressed in 
their treatment of black defendants.
61
 
Alabama whites were especially incensed by criticism over Scottsboro 
because they felt that they deserved praise for avoiding a lynching.  The 
Scottsboro Progressive Age complimented local citizens for ―their patience 
and chivalry‖62 after the alleged rapes, and the Chattanooga Daily Times 
praised them for setting ―the rest of the South an impressive example in self-
restraint.‖63  A Georgia newspaper warned that appealing the convictions of 
black men for raping white women was ―playing with fire‖; a hasty trial was 
preferable to a lynching and indeed was ―a first step, and a very important 
one.‖64  Many southern newspapers predicted a resurgence in lynchings if 
outsiders persisted in criticizing trials such as those at Scottsboro.
65
 
 
59. Id. at 136 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
60. E.g., Tannehill v. State, 48 So. 662, 662 (Ala. 1909); Williams v. State, 146 So. 422, 424 
(Ala. 1933); Bell v. State, 20 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Ark. 1929); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282, 286 (Ga. 
1914); State v. Jones, 53 So. 959, 961 (La. 1911); Byrd v. State, 123 So. 867, 870–71 (Miss. 1929); 
Story v. State, 97 So. 806, 807 (Miss. 1923); Sykes v. State, 42 So. 875, 875 (Miss. 1907); MANGUM, 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO, supra note 13, at 343–49, 356–63; MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY, 
supra note 9, at 197–223. 
61. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 130–31. 
62. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 105 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
63. Id. at 106 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
64. Emanuel, Lynching and the Law in Georgia, supra note 14, at 246–47 n.161 (quoting 
Editorial, Playing with Fire, FORUM (Washington, Ga.), June 25, 1931) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
65. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 105–16; see also The Steffens–Dreiser Nonsense, 
unidentified newspaper, May 22, 1931, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 
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When the Scottsboro appeal reached the state supreme court, its justices 
were said to be seething with anger at the protests and threats directed at 
them.
66
  The Communist Party newspaper, the Daily Worker, had called the 
court an ―instrument of the Wall Street Imperialists,‖ which would surely 
affirm the boys‘ convictions.67  Chief Justice John C. Anderson publicly 
criticized such statements, which he said had been made with ―the evident 
intent to bulldoze this court,‖68 and he insisted that the justices ―will not be 
intimidated.‖69 
In their appeals, the ILD lawyers briefly raised the issues of race 
discrimination in jury selection and the inadequacy of defense counsel, but 
they emphasized the unfairness of the trials and especially the mob‘s 
influence on the juries.  In reply, the state attorney general denied that ―a 
curious mob‖ had influenced the outcome of the trials.70  The headline in the 
Montgomery Advertiser‘s report of the oral argument observed, ―Negro 
Partisans ‗Dictate‘ Course to High Court.‖71 
The Alabama Supreme Court had previously reversed convictions in 
similar cases of mob domination.
72
  Other southern courts in less publicized 
cases had reversed convictions when defense counsel had been appointed 
even a couple of days before trial.
73
  Yet on March 24, 1932, the Alabama 
Supreme Court voted 6–1 to uphold the death sentences of four of the 
defendants.  The court granted a new trial to Eugene Williams because he had 
been a juvenile—thirteen years old—at the time of conviction.74  The court 
emphasized that the speed of the trials was ―highly desirable‖ because it 
instilled greater respect for the law and that the presence of national 
guardsmen surrounding the courthouse gave ―notice to everybody that the 
strong arm of the state was there to assure the accused a lawful trial.‖75  The 
 
8, frame 134 (probably appearing in the MONTGOMERY ADV. and applauding the citizens of Jackson 
County for deporting themselves ―with dignity and self-restraint‖ and noting that prompt action like 
that taken by the court in the Scottsboro cases is what critics of mob violence had always urged as a 
substitute for lynchings). 
66. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 156.  
67. Id. at 156 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
68. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO, 
supra note 6, at 49. 
69. Defers New Action in Scottsboro Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 13. 
70. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 157. 
71. Id. at 158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676, 676 (Ala. 1898). 
73. E.g., McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 205 S.W. 915, 918 (Ky. 1918); Stroud v. 
Commonwealth, 169 S.W. 1021, 1022–23 (Ky. 1914); State v. Collins, 29 So. 180, 181–82 (La. 
1900) (discussing numerous additional Louisiana cases).  
74. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 213–14 (Ala. 1932), rev’d, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
75. Powell, 141 So. at 211, 213; see also CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 158 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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court also ruled sufficient the appointment of counsel on the morning of trial.  
In a letter to the NAACP‘s Walter White, Chief Justice Anderson, the sole 
dissenter, explained that the communists had ―been very imprudent and 
injected a lot of irrelevant bunk into the controversy and instead of helping it 
possibly injured these defendants.‖76  Anderson, who had much preferred that 
―these defendants be tried under different circumstances,‖ regretted that his 
colleagues had not been ―above permitting outside influence to prejudice 
these defendants.‖77  As a reward for his efforts, Anderson received a 
telegram from an ILD branch assailing him as a ―traitor to the masses‖ for his 
willingness to abide by the majority‘s decision.78 
The Montgomery Advertiser opined that the court‘s ruling ―should satisfy 
all reasonable persons‖ that the Scottsboro boys had received fair trials.79  Yet 
several other Alabama newspapers regretted that the court had not granted a 
new trial to allay doubts regarding the defendants‘ guilt.  The Birmingham 
Age-Herald observed, ―[t]he fact remains that there was an element of mob 
feeling in the air,‖80 and the Birmingham News insisted there was ―ground for 
divergence of opinions concerning these cases.‖81  Moderate whites in 
Alabama blamed the ruling on communist efforts at intimidation, which they 
suspected the state jurists had ―leaned unconsciously backwards‖ to resist.82  
A black newspaper similarly concluded, ―it is possible that the highest legal 
tribunal in Alabama affirmed these death sentences because it did no[t] want 
to appear as being swayed, cowed or bluffed by a group of radicals.‖83  
Communists thought the ruling revealed the ―highest courts working hand in 
glove with owners of America against [the] working class.‖84 
 
76. Letter from John C. Anderson, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Alabama, to Walter White, 
Secretary, NAACP (Apr. 25, 1932), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 5, 
frame 792. 
77. Id. 
78. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 170 n.98 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
79. Id. at 159 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
80. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
81. Editorial, The Affirmation of the Scottsboro Cases, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 25, 1932, 
microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 586. 
82. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 159 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also Scottsboro Boys Doomed, SAVANNAH TRIB. (Ga.), Apr. 14, 1932, microformed 
on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 651 (―Even if the judges were inclined to be 
more merciful, the bombarding of them with letters and telegrams, many of these containing threats, 
would cause less favorable action.‖). 
83. The Scottsboro Appeal, SAN ANTONIO INQUIRER, Apr. 8, 1932, microformed on NAACP 
Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 631 (excerpting editorial from the HOUSTON DEFENDER, 
Apr. 2, 1932). 
84. Backs Conviction of Seven Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1932, at 6 (quoting a telegram 
from the ILD to Governor Miller of Alabama).  
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The Daily Worker predicted that review by the U.S. Supreme Court—just 
another ―capitalist court‖85—would be a ―mere gesture aimed at facilitating 
the legal lynching of these children.‖86  A black newspaper in the North 
professed greater faith in the high court, reasoning that ―America, grasping for 
the moral leadership of the world, cannot afford to set the example of staging 
a legal lynching.‖87  The liberal Nation agreed that the boys‘ prospects were 
―very bright‖ because ―the conscience of the world [would] be profoundly 
shocked‖ if the Court affirmed their convictions and thus ―encourag[ed] legal 
lynching in the South.‖88 
D.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
In 1932 the U.S. Supreme Court was hardly the champion of racial 
equality that it would one day become in popular mythology.  Around 1900, 
the Court had sustained the constitutionality of laws mandating racial 
segregation
89
 and disfranchising blacks,
90
 leading the fledging NAACP to 
conclude in 1915 that the Court ―has virtually declared that the colored man 
has no civil rights.‖91  To be sure, the Court in the second decade of the 
twentieth century struck down residential segregation ordinances,
92
 certain 
laws that promoted peonage (compulsory labor to discharge debts),
93
 and the 
grandfather clause (a device insulating illiterate whites from the 
disfranchising effect of literacy tests).
94
  But in 1927 the Court strongly 
implied that state-mandated racial segregation in public schools was 
constitutionally permissible,
95
 and in 1935 the Court would unanimously 
sustain the exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party primaries—the only 
 
85. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO, supra note 6, at 160 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
86. Id. at 160 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
87. IOWA BYSTANDER, Jan. 30, 1932, microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, 
reel 8, frame 562. 
88. The Scottsboro Case, 135 NATION 320 (1932), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 
17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 745. 
89. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–52 
(1896). 
90. E.g., Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 166–67 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485–88 
(1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898); see generally KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 8–60 (surveying the Court‘s performance in race-related 
cases during the Jim Crow era). 
91. NAACP, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT: REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS (1914), reprinted in 9 CRISIS 286, 293 (1915).  
92. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917).  
93. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 
(1911). 
94. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 367 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 382–
83 (1915); see generally KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 61–97 
(surveying the Court‘s performance in race-related cases during the Progressive era). 
95. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85–87 (1927).  
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elections that mattered in the one-party South.
96
  In 1932, virtually nobody 
thought of the Court as a heroic defender of the rights of racial minorities.
97
 
Nor had the Court yet taken substantial strides toward protecting the 
procedural rights of criminal defendants in state courts.  Prior to Moore v. 
Dempsey
98
 in 1923, the Court had reversed state criminal convictions on 
federal constitutional grounds in only a handful of cases involving race 
discrimination in jury selection.
99
  In other cases, the Court had denied that the 
Fourteenth Amendment converted the procedural protections of the federal 
Bill of Rights into safeguards against state governments and had narrowly 
construed the Due Process Clause of that Amendment, which does explicitly 
constrain the states.
100
 
Moore was the progenitor of modern American criminal procedure.  The 
case arose from an infamous racial massacre in Phillips County, Arkansas, in 
1919.  Black tenant farmers and sharecroppers had tried to organize a union 
and hire white lawyers to sue planters for peonage practices.  Local whites 
cracked down with a vengeance.  When whites shot into a church where black 
unionists were meeting, blacks returned the gunfire.  A white man was killed, 
and mayhem quickly ensued.  Marauding whites, supported by federal troops 
ostensibly dispatched to quell the disturbance, went on a rampage, tracking 
down blacks throughout the countryside and killing dozens of them.  Seventy-
nine blacks, and no whites, were prosecuted and convicted for their actions 
during this ―race riot,‖ and twelve received the death penalty.  The trials of 
those twelve lasted only an hour or two each, and the juries, from which 
blacks had been systematically excluded, deliberated for only a few minutes.  
Huge mobs of angry whites surrounded the courthouse, menacing the 
 
96. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53–55 (1935) (sustaining the exclusion of blacks from 
Democratic Party primaries when the decision to exclude was made by the party convention).  But cf. 
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (striking down a state law authorizing party executive 
committees to exclude groups from participating in party primaries); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 
536, 541 (1927) (striking down a state law barring blacks from participating in primary elections) .  
See generally KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 98–170 (surveying the 
Court‘s performance in race-related cases during the interwar period). 
97. Compare Zechariah Chafee Jr., Liberal Trends in the Supreme Court, 35 CURRENT 
HISTORY 338, 339, 343 (1931) (noting a recent liberal trend on the Supreme Court in cases involving 
economic regulation and freedom of speech, but saying nothing about such a trend on race issues) 
with FRANK FREIDEL, F.D.R. AND THE SOUTH 92–94 (1965) (noting that some southern senators 
opposed President Roosevelt‘s Court-packing plan in 1937 partly because they saw the Court as a 
bulwark of white supremacy). 
98. 261 U.S. 86, 91–92 (1923). 
99. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 448–49 
(1900); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397–98 (1881); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 
310, 312 (1880). 
100. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 592–93 
(1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534–35 (1884). 
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defendants and the jurors and threatening a lynching.  Five of the defendants 
appealed their death sentences to the Supreme Court, arguing that mob-
dominated trials violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  By a vote of 6–2, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the 
convictions, and ordered a federal district judge to conduct a hearing on 
whether the defendants‘ trials had been influenced by the mob.101 
Moore offered some hope that the Scottsboro defendants might find 
justice in the Supreme Court.  Their lawyers raised three constitutional claims 
in their appeal: mob domination of the trials in violation of the Due Process 
Clause; intentional exclusion of blacks from the grand and petit juries in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and denial of the right to counsel in 
violation of the Due Process Clause.
102
  On the day of the oral argument, extra 
police officers patrolled the Supreme Court building and grounds; the plaza 
facing the Capitol was cleared; and elaborate preparations were made to 
preempt the mass communist demonstrations that had been promised.
103
  
Mary Mooney, mother of the imprisoned California labor leader Tom Mooney 
(who had been wrongfully convicted for the Preparedness Day bombing in 
San Francisco in 1916), attended the Court session, noting her interest in 
seeing that other mothers‘ sons received justice.104  Several of Alabama‘s 
congressmen also attended the argument, as did an unusually large number of 
blacks.
105
 
A few weeks later, the Court reversed the defendants‘ convictions on the 
ground that the right to counsel had been denied, declining to reach the other 
two issues.
106
  Perhaps the justices chose the basis for decision that they 
deemed least controversial.  For the Court to have reversed the Scottsboro 
convictions on the basis of Moore might have required basic changes in Jim 
Crow justice: The Scottsboro trials were not quite so farcical as those of the 
Phillips County defendants.  The Scottsboro boys received a genuine defense; 
their trials lasted for several hours (not forty-five minutes); the juries trying 
them deliberated more than the five minutes in Moore; their cases did not 
 
101. RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS 
RIOT CASES 7–23 (1988); KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 98, 120–
23; O.A. Rogers, Jr., The Elaine Race Riots of 1919, 19 ARK. HIST. Q. 142, 142–50 (1960). 
102. See Brief for Petitioners at 3–4, 34–62, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Nos. 98, 
99, and 100), reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299–300, 330–58 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1975).  
103. Guarded High Court Hears the Negro Pleas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1932, at 19, 
microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 6, reel 8, frame 743. 
104. Id.; Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 98 (1987). 
105. Guarded High Court Hears the Negro Pleas, supra note 103. 
106. Powell, 287 U.S. at 73. 
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raise the broader implications of the Phillips County race riot; and they had 
not been tortured into confessing.
107
  Similarly, to invalidate their convictions 
because of race discrimination in jury selection would have been far more 
provocative to white southerners because preserving white supremacy in the 
courtroom required excluding blacks from juries.
108
  By contrast, overturning 
the convictions because the defendants had been denied the right to counsel 
was unlikely to affect the outcome of any retrials or Jim Crow justice in 
general.
109
 
Prior to 1932, the Court had never ruled that due process requires the 
states to provide counsel to indigent defendants in capital cases, but neither 
had it rejected that position.  Every state court confronting that issue had 
required the government to appoint counsel in such circumstances.
110
  To be 
sure, Ozie Powell, whose appeal was the focus of the Supreme Court‘s first 
intervention in Scottsboro, had received a court-appointed lawyer.  He made 
two arguments as to why this appointment failed to satisfy federal 
constitutional standards.
111
  First, the state had not afforded him adequate 
opportunity to hire counsel of his own choice.  Second, the court appointment 
was inadequate because it had been made the morning of the trial, and thus 
defense counsel was denied an adequate opportunity to consult clients, 
interview witnesses, and prepare a defense. 
The Alabama court had deemed this last-minute appointment of counsel 
sufficient to satisfy the state constitutional requirement of a court-appointed 
lawyer in capital cases.  In general, the U.S. Supreme Court has no authority 
to review state court interpretations of state law.  Thus, for the Court to 
reverse Powell‘s conviction, it would have had to construe the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require the assistance of counsel in 
capital cases.  American constitutional history reveals that the justices are 
least reluctant to expand constitutional rights when doing so involves holding 
a few renegade states to the norm already espoused by the vast majority.
112
  
As of 1932, not a single state had rejected the right of indigent defendants in 
capital cases to state-appointed counsel.  Indeed, one reason that state courts 
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had not yet considered whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment guaranteed such a right is that all of them confronting the issue 
had interpreted their own state constitutions to do so. 
Once the justices determined that due process required the appointment of 
counsel for indigent capital defendants, reversing Powell‘s conviction was 
easy.  First, Powell had been denied the opportunity to hire a lawyer of his 
own choice.  Second, to most disinterested observers, the trial judge‘s 
appointment of counsel had been obviously inadequate.  At the trials, 
although defense counsel did cross-examine prosecution witnesses, they made 
only a feeble effort to change the trial venue, presented neither opening nor 
closing arguments, and called none of their own witnesses other than the 
defendants, some of whom implicated each other in a desperate effort to avoid 
the death penalty.
113
  The Scottsboro trials may not have been quite the sham 
affair under review in Moore, yet most lawyers would have considered 
obviously inadequate the representation afforded to the defendants. 
Moreover, the trial record revealed a high probability that the defendants 
were innocent—a circumstance likely to be significant to Supreme Court 
justices reviewing their convictions, even if technically irrelevant to the merits 
of their appeal.  Because criminal procedure safeguards often shield the guilty 
from punishment, they are usually controversial, and the justices are probably 
more inclined to identify new rights in cases where defendants have a strong 
claim of innocence.  As we have seen, the medical evidence introduced at the 
Scottsboro trials raised serious doubts as to whether any rape had occurred, and 
the accusers had provided inconsistent testimony.
114
  Moreover, the women 
possessed a clear motive for fabrication: avoiding a possible Mann Act 
prosecution for traveling across state lines for immoral purposes (prostitution). 
Many newspapers, even in parts of the South, applauded the high court‘s 
decision in Powell.  The Richmond Times-Dispatch went so far as to say that 
the ruling ―will be welcomed throughout the country, with the possible 
exception of Alabama.‖115  The New York Times likewise hailed the ruling, 
which it said ―ought to abate the rancor of extreme radicals, while confirming 
the faith of the American people in the soundness of their institutions and 
especially in the integrity of their courts.‖116  Professor Felix Frankfurter of 
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the Harvard Law School called the decision ―a notable chapter in the history 
of liberty‖ and observed that the same Court that had recently served the 
interests of property owners was now protecting ―illiterate‖ and ―vagrant‖ 
blacks from oppression.
117
  A black newspaper proclaimed the ruling ―a great 
stroke in the name of justice,‖118 and the NAACP saw it as a ―vindicat[ion]‖ 
of its view that victories for racial justice ―are best won by strictly legal 
means.‖119  By contrast, the Daily Worker condemned Powell for instructing 
Alabama authorities on ―how ‗properly‘ to carry through such lynch 
schemes.‖120  The liberal lawyer Morris Ernst likewise assailed the decision as 
―empty and meaningless‖ and ―cunningly uncourageous‖ because it 
disregarded the issues of ―deep social significance‖ and left the defendants in 
―horrid shape‖ for a retrial, which was likely to feature a half-hearted lawyer 
―who will saunter . . . before a white jury while mobs outside sing anthems 
and shout for hangings.‖121 
E.  On Remand 
The Supreme Court‘s ruling seemed only to make Alabama whites more 
defensive.  After the initial trials, some of them had doubted whether the 
defendants had been treated fairly.  However, after what the Birmingham Post 
called the high court‘s ―stinging rebuke‖ of the state supreme court, anyone 
publicly expressing doubts about the defendants‘ guilt or the fairness of their 
trials was courting physical danger.
122
  White Alabamians also greatly 
resented northern newspaper accounts that portrayed them as barefooted, 
tobacco-chewing illiterates.  Judge Hawkins opined with regard to the retrials 
that ―[t]he presence of troops will be more imperative now than ever.‖123 
The ILD asked Samuel Leibowitz, a New York Jew and one of the 
nation‘s leading criminal defense lawyers, to represent the defendants at their 
new trials.  Leibowitz agreed to serve without fee in exchange for a promise 
of independence in orchestrating the defense and a commitment from the ILD 
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to lower its public profile regarding Scottsboro.  Upon arriving in Alabama, 
Leibowitz sought to distance the case from the communist issue and professed 
no intention to tell Alabamians how to run their affairs.
124
 
As the retrials began, Leibowitz moved for a change of venue, which was 
granted, to Decatur, Alabama, fifty miles west of Scottsboro.  Yet nearly all 
whites in Decatur were already convinced of the defendants‘ guilt.  A large 
crowd attended the first of the retrials, though the threat of violence that 
pervaded the original proceedings was initially absent.  The Scottsboro 
episode had attracted so much national attention by then that representatives 
of several New York newspapers and the wire services were in attendance.
125
 
As the retrial proceedings began, Leibowitz moved to quash the original 
indictments on the ground that no blacks had served on grand juries in 
Jackson County since Reconstruction, even though they were nearly 10% of 
the county‘s population.  Summoned to testify, the county‘s jury 
commissioners denied that blacks were excluded because of their race.  
Leibowitz also called as witnesses several blacks from Jackson County to 
demonstrate that they satisfied the statutory jury-selection standard of 
―integrity, good character and sound judgment.‖126  The prosecutor tried to 
humiliate and intimidate these black witnesses, but they held up well under 
cross-examination, and Leibowitz established that they were as well qualified 
as many whites to serve as jurors.  Nevertheless, Judge James Edwin Horton 
overruled the motion to quash the indictments.
127
 
Leibowitz then challenged the jury-selection system in Morgan County, 
site of the new trials.  He called as witnesses ten prominent blacks from the 
county to demonstrate their qualifications to serve as jurors.  These educated 
and refined blacks, most of whom held college degrees, made impressive 
witnesses.
128
 
Leibowitz‘s trial tactics provoked outrage among the local white citizenry.  
When he demanded that the prosecutor refer to black witnesses with courtesy 
titles, courtroom spectators were merely puzzled, but when he questioned the 
honesty of county jury commissioners, they grew visibly angry.  A crowd of 
200 young men gathered in town to ―protest against the manner in which Mr. 
Leibowitz has examined the State‘s witnesses.‖129  After Judge Horton 
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rejected the defense‘s challenge to jury selection, he admonished courtroom 
spectators about the death threats being made against Leibowitz on Decatur 
streets and warned that he would order the national guardsmen to shoot to kill 
if any effort was made to harm the defendants.
130
 
The prosecution‘s strategy at Patterson‘s retrial was to have Victoria Price 
testify as graphically as possible about the rapes.  Leibowitz‘s cross-
examination was brutal, as he tried to demonstrate that Price was a prostitute 
and that her account of what happened on the train was riddled with 
contradictions.  Price proved a feisty witness who yielded no ground, although 
Leibowitz was able to elicit from her some contradictory statements.  Any 
damage he did to Price‘s credibility, however, came at the cost of alienating 
courtroom whites, who were outraged at this attack on the chastity and 
honesty of a southern white woman.  One spectator whispered to another, 
―It‘ll be a wonder if ever he leaves town alive,‖ and angry local residents 
again gathered in town, this time to protest the manner in which Leibowitz 
had cross-examined Price.
131
  Once again, Judge Horton responded by 
strongly defending the rule of law, denouncing the ―mob spirit,‖132 and 
insisting that he would defend the lives of the defendants and anyone else 
involved in the case.
133
 
One of the examining physicians, Dr. R.R. Bridges, testified that all of the 
sperm found in Price‘s vagina was non-motile, which should have been 
conclusive exculpatory evidence, given that the alleged rapes had occurred 
only ninety minutes before the medical examination.  A second doctor, 
Marvin Lynch, privately confessed to Judge Horton that he had never believed 
that the young women had been raped.  But Lynch rejected Horton‘s 
exhortations to state this view publicly, explaining that ―[i]f I testified for 
those boys I‘d never be able to go back into Jackson County.‖134  The 
defendant‘s medical expert, Dr. Edward A. Reisman, testified that a woman 
raped by six men, as alleged, could not possibly have in her vagina only the 
small traces of semen found in the medical examination of Price.  Reisman 
also declared that women who had just been repeatedly raped could not have 
appeared as calm and collected as Price and Bates had been.  One local 
resident was unimpressed by this testimony: ―When a nigger has expert 
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witnesses, we have a right to ask who is paying for them.‖135 
The star witness for the defense was Ruby Bates, who made a dramatic 
entrance and retracted her earlier allegations of rape.  However, her 
credibility, necessarily compromised by her contrary testimony in the original 
trials, was further impeached by the prosecution‘s suggestion that she had 
been paid to testify—an allegation that apparently convinced most locals.  In 
closing arguments, one prosecutor referred to the ―fancy New York 
clothes‖136 worn by Bates and, pointing at the Jewish defense attorneys 
(Leibowitz and Joseph Brodsky of the ILD), appealed to the jury to prove that 
Alabama justice could not be bought ―with Jew money from New York.‖137  
Another prosecutor told the jury, ―If you acquit this Negro, put a garland of 
roses around his neck, give him a supper and send him to New York City‖ 
where Dr. Harry Fosdick (the liberal Protestant minister who had provided 
support for Bates) would ―dress him up in a high hat and morning coat, gray-
striped trousers and spats.‖138 
Even if this had been a run-of-the-mill, black-on-white rape case, it would 
have been difficult for a jury of southern whites to have acquitted Patterson.  
But Scottsboro was no ordinary case.  With communists attacking white 
Alabamians as lynchers, and Leibowitz assailing southern white jury 
commissioners as liars, an acquittal was out of the question.  The trial had 
ceased to be about determining Patterson‘s guilt or innocence and had become 
instead a challenge to southern white supremacy.  With the issue framed this 
way, the jury took just five minutes to convict (though one juror held out 
against the death penalty for hours before finally capitulating).  Leibowitz 
called the result ―a triumph of bigotry,‖ and the Chicago Defender, one of the 
leading black newspapers in the country, denounced the trial ―as a mockery, a 
pretension of justice and a crime against our national honor.‖139  New York 
newspapers professed ―shock‖ at the verdict,140 while some southern 
newspapers blamed any unfairness on outside agitation, which Alabama 
whites naturally resented.
141
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The day Patterson was convicted, 20,000 blacks in New York City signed 
a petition promising to join a protest march in Washington, D.C., later that 
spring.  Huge crowds gathered in New York to hear Ruby Bates proclaim 
herself a victim of the oppression of the Scottsboro ruling class and to hear 
Leibowitz denigrate Alabama whites as ―bigots whose mouths are slits in their 
faces, whose eyes pop out like a frog‘s, whose chins drip tobacco juice, 
bewhiskered and filthy.‖142  The New York press faithfully reported such 
comments, which were then widely reprinted in Alabama newspapers, making 
Leibowitz even more anathema to southern whites.  One Alabama journal 
retorted, ―The New York Jew says there is no such thing as a fair trial in 
Alabama. . . .  It seems to this paper . . . [that] this recent recruit from Russia 
is a poor sort of chap to try to blight the good name of Alabama.‖143 
After pronouncing sentence on Patterson, Judge Horton delayed the other 
retrials because Leibowitz‘s statements to the press were a ―millstone around 
the necks of the defendants.‖144  Meanwhile, for the first time, some southern 
newspapers outside of Alabama declared the boys innocent.  Douglas Southall 
Freeman, editor of the Richmond News Leader, observed that ―[t]he men are 
being sentenced to death primarily because they are black‖ and because of the 
―‗unwritten law‘ that when a white woman accuses . . . a Negro he must prove 
his innocence.‖145  Josephus Daniels, editor of the Raleigh News and 
Observer, called the verdict ―shocking‖146 and ―outrageous.‖147  The 
Chattanooga News declared that one could not ―conceive of a civilized 
community taking human lives on the strength of this miserable affair.‖148  By 
contrast, newspapers in the Deep South tended to defend the fairness of the 
trials.
149
 
In Alabama, the few whites who continued to raise doubts about the 
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fairness of the defendants‘ treatment were forcefully suppressed.  A sociology 
professor at Birmingham-Southern College who was sympathetic to the 
defendants was denied an extension of his contract.  Rabbi Benjamin 
Goldstein, another supporter, was forced to resign from his temple in 
Montgomery and then to leave the state; his congregants worried that the 
rabbi‘s controversial stand on Scottsboro would unleash a wave of anti-
Semitism.  One observer noted that many whites conceded the defendants‘ 
probable innocence but nonetheless insisted, ―If we let Negroes get by with 
this case, no white woman will be safe in the South.‖150  Many moderates 
apparently hoped that the governor would commute the sentences to life 
imprisonment, apparently deeming this an acceptable compromise for black 
men falsely accused of raping white women.
151
 
In June 1933, Judge Horton, whom Leibowitz had called ―one of the finest 
jurists I have ever met,‖152 granted the defense motion for a new trial, 
explaining that he found the evidence against Patterson unconvincing.  Horton 
secretly hoped that his action would forestall further prosecutions of the 
defendants.
153
 
The Birmingham Post applauded Horton‘s decision and declared the 
defendants probably innocent, but it was the only newspaper in the state to do 
so.
154
  Some prominent whites in Alabama, including the president of the state 
bar association, also endorsed Horton‘s ruling, but the predominant reaction in 
the state was hostile.  Tom Heflin, a former U.S. Senator from Alabama, 
declared that Horton‘s ruling was ―putting wicked thoughts in the minds of 
lawless negro men and greatly increasing the danger to the white women of 
Alabama.‖155  The state attorney general who had helped prosecute the case, 
Thomas E. Knight, Jr., sought to have the judge—whom one critic derided as 
having ―no more backbone than in an angle worm‖—removed from the 
case.
156
  The following year, Horton, who had faced no opposition when he 
stood for election six years earlier, was defeated for reelection.  By contrast, 
Knight was elected lieutenant governor.
157
 
The Scottsboro retrials resumed in November 1933.  Recent developments 
raised doubts as to whether the defendants and their lawyers could be 
protected from mob violence.  That summer in Tuscaloosa, three ILD lawyers 
defending blacks charged with raping and killing a white woman had been 
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turned over by deputy sheriffs to a firing squad, and two of them were killed.  
In September, an elderly black man accused of raping a mentally retarded 
white woman—even the police found the allegation incredible—was lynched.  
The local newspaper blamed the ILD for spreading communist propaganda 
among ―our contented Negro population,‖158 while the Montgomery 
Advertiser attributed the lynchings to ―hotheads who . . . fear[ed] that outside 
interference would block the course of justice.‖159  Yet, with Birmingham 
newspapers noting an ―extremely grave‖ probability of a massacre,160 Judge 
W.W. Callahan, the new trial judge, declined to request militia protection for 
the trials, and the governor sent none.  Callahan also denied the defense 
motion for another change of venue, despite sworn statements in affidavits 
submitted by ILD investigators that a national guardsman had conceded he 
and his colleagues would offer only token resistance to a lynching attempt and 
that local whites had admitted they would conceal their belief that the boys 
should be executed in order to get on the jury.
161
 
Before the new trials had begun, the jury commissioners in Jackson 
County, where the defendants had been originally indicted, had altered the 
jury lists by adding the names of several blacks.  A defense handwriting 
expert testified that the names of most or perhaps all of the blacks had been 
fraudulently added after the lists had been initially compiled.  Despite this 
uncontradicted testimony, Judge Callahan invoked the presumption that jury 
commissioners had acted lawfully and rejected the defense motion to quash 
the indictments.
162
 
At Patterson‘s retrial, Judge Callahan refused to permit Leibowitz to 
question Victoria Price about whether she had had sexual intercourse the night 
before the train trip, and he nearly ruled Leibowitz in contempt when the 
lawyer persisted in trying to get such evidence before the jury.
163
  Callahan 
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repeatedly rescued Price when she became bogged down in contradictions, 
and he denied Leibowitz the opportunity to undermine the credibility of 
prosecution witnesses.  Intimidated by death threats and recovering from 
surgery in a New York hospital, Ruby Bates refused to return to Alabama to 
testify.  The prosecution used against Patterson his earlier admission that he 
had seen some of the black youths raping the women.  Yet the prosecutor‘s 
most effective point may have been the question he posed to jurors in his 
closing argument: Did they really wish to believe the defendant‘s account, 
which essentially charged their neighbors in Scottsboro with doing ―a lot of 
awful things over there‖?164 
Callahan instructed the jury that ―there is a very strong presumption under 
the law that [a white woman charging rape] would not and did not yield 
voluntarily to intercourse with . . . a Negro‖ and that this was true ―whether 
she be the most despised, ignorant and abandoned woman of the community, 
or the spotless virgin and daughter of a prominent home of luxury and 
learning.‖165  The judge glowered at Leibowitz while instructing the jury to 
ignore any of defense counsel‘s intimations regarding Price‘s prior sexual 
history, then forgot—until Leibowitz reminded him—to give the jury the 
instruction form for rendering a verdict of acquittal.  The jurors would have 
been unlikely to miss the significance of this oversight.
166
  The jury convicted 
Patterson and sentenced him to death, and then a second jury did the same in 
the retrial of Clarence Norris.  Leibowitz left the courtroom under heavy 
guard because of death threats.
167
 
On appeal, both defendants challenged their convictions on the ground of 
race discrimination in jury selection.  Supreme Court precedents from around 
1900 made it very difficult to prove such discrimination.
168
  The Alabama 
Supreme Court rejected Norris‘s claim on the basis of these precedents.169  
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The court refused to presume discrimination by the jury commissioners, 
denied any affirmative duty to place blacks on juries, and deferred to the 
commissioners‘ denials of race discrimination.  With regard to the appellant‘s 
claim that Callahan‘s administration of the trial was reversible error, the 
Alabama jurists found only that ―on one or two occasions [he had] manifested 
slight impatience.‖170  The court did not even reach the merits of Patterson‘s 
appeal because of an arguable failure to comply with Alabama‘s rules of 
appellate procedure.  The flaw was highly technical: Patterson‘s claim was 
untimely only if the ninety-day period in which to file a bill of exceptions 
commenced at the date of judgment rather than the date of sentencing and if 
his new-trial motion, which would have tolled the ninety-day period, was 
nugatory because filed after expiration of the trial court‘s term.  (And even 
then, the bill of exceptions had been filed late only because of a plane crash.)  
Technical though it was, this procedural snafu placed Patterson‘s life in 
jeopardy.  The Alabama Supreme Court refused to consider the merits of his 
jury-discrimination claim,
171
 which apparently meant that the U.S. Supreme 
Court could not do so either, even though Patterson‘s appeal rested on 
precisely the same ground as Norris‘s.172 
F.  The U.S. Supreme Court—Again 
Late in 1934, two ILD attorneys were caught trying to bribe Victoria Price 
to change her story.  An infuriated Leibowitz declared that the ILD had 
―assassinated the Scottsboro boys with that sort of business,‖ and he 
threatened to terminate his involvement with the case unless the communists 
withdrew.
173
  The Daily Worker responded by accusing Leibowitz of joining 
forces with the ―Alabama lynch rulers,‖ and the ILD tried to fire him on the 
pretense that he was inexperienced in constitutional appeals.
174
  But Leibowitz 
convinced Patterson, Norris, and their parents to stick with him.  As in 1931, 
however, a subsequent visit from ILD lawyers promptly convinced the boys 
and their families to change their minds.  Another unseemly battle for control 
of the case ensued—this time between Leibowitz and the ILD.  Only after the 
defendants had switched back and forth numerous times was a compromise 
finally reached: Leibowitz represented Norris in the Supreme Court, while 
other lawyers hired by the ILD represented Patterson.
175
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Norris‘s appeal focused on race discrimination in jury selection.  Alabama 
responded by invoking Thomas v. Texas,
176
 which held that the U.S. Supreme 
Court must defer to state court findings of fact on that issue.  During 
Leibowitz‘s argument, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes interrupted to ask 
if the lawyer could prove his allegation that the names of blacks had been 
forged on the jury rolls.  Leibowitz said that he could, and in a moment of 
high drama, the justices examined the jury rolls of Jackson County through 
magnifying glasses—apparently the first time they had ever engaged in 
independent evidence-gathering in appellate proceedings.
177
 
Six weeks later, the justices overturned Norris‘s conviction—the first time 
in decades the Court had done so on the ground of race discrimination in jury 
selection.  To be sure, Norris created no new substantive constitutional law: 
Since Strauder v. West Virginia
178
 in 1880, the Court had consistently 
construed the Equal Protection Clause to bar race discrimination in jury 
selection.  However, Norris did alter the critical rules governing how such 
claims were to be proved; for over a generation, these rules had doomed to 
failure virtually all such claims.  The justices now reinvigorated the long-
dormant dicta of Neal v. Delaware,
179
 which approved inferring intentional 
discrimination from the lengthy absence of blacks from jury service.
180
  If, 
under such circumstances, the state was not obliged to go beyond simply 
denying the existence of race discrimination, then the constitutional safeguard 
―would be but a vain and illusory requirement.‖181  Further, Norris held, when 
an alleged federal constitutional violation turned on disputed facts, the federal 
courts must find those facts for themselves, not simply defer to state court 
findings.
182
 
For two reasons, Norris was an appealing case for the justices to 
reconsider the rules governing proof of race discrimination in jury selection.  
First, not only had blacks been absent for decades from juries in these 
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Alabama counties, but local court officers had been caught in an embarrassing 
lie, the only plausible explanation for which was their desire to cover up the 
intentional exclusion of blacks from juries.  Second, by 1935, the innocence 
of the Scottsboro boys, in the words of one northern journal, had ―long been 
established before the bar of public opinion.‖183  Most Americans apparently 
found Ruby Bates‘s recantation more persuasive evidence of the defendants‘ 
innocence than had the Morgan County jury.  Even many southern 
newspapers ―rejoic[ed]‖184 in the Court‘s decision reversing Norris‘s 
conviction because, as one of them put it, ―The conscience of the nation and 
the world is convinced that the seven Negroes are not guilty of the crime of 
which they were charged.‖185 
The reversal of Norris‘s conviction need not necessarily have helped 
Patterson because of the alleged procedural flaw in his appeal.  Yet the 
justices, after acknowledging Alabama‘s right to dismiss federal claims not 
raised in compliance with the state‘s own appellate procedure rules, 
nonetheless remanded Patterson‘s case to the state court to reconsider in light 
of Norris.
186
  As justification for this unprecedented move, the justices 
professed themselves unwilling to believe that Alabama judges would have 
condemned Patterson to death because of procedural flaws in his appeal had 
they foreseen that the Supreme Court would soon invalidate the jury-selection 
procedures used in his case.
187
 
G.  Subsequent History 
The ILD regarded its victory in the high court as ―another proof of the 
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might of mass pressure and mass protest.‖188  By contrast, Leibowitz saw it as 
a ―triumph for American justice and . . . an answer to all those subversive 
elements who seek to engender hatred against our form of government.‖189  
The New York Times similarly declared that the decision ―shows that the 
highest court in the land is anxious to secure and protect the rights of the 
humblest citizens.‖190 
Governor D. Bibb Graves of Alabama proclaimed that the Court‘s 
decisions were the ―supreme law of the land‖ and that ―we must put the names 
of Negroes in jury boxes in every county.‖191  He even mailed a copy of the 
rulings to all circuit judges in the state with instructions to comply.  
Newspapers outside of the South applauded the governor‘s stance, but in the 
Deep South the reaction was different.  The Charleston News and Courier 
declared that putting blacks on juries was out of the question because it 
―would revolutionize Southern jurisprudence and demoralize Southern 
civilization.‖192  Thus, the Supreme Court decision could and would be 
―evaded.‖193  Because the Fourteenth Amendment had been ―imposed on the 
South when it was bound hand and foot and gagged . . . [it was] not binding 
upon [the] honor or morals‖ of the South.194 
The Court‘s second round of Scottsboro reversals did not, as some had 
hoped, deter Alabama from trying again.  Leibowitz endeavored to persuade 
Governor Graves to block further prosecutions, but the Court‘s interventions 
had only further inflamed public opinion in Alabama.  The state‘s high court 
faithfully quashed the indictments but clarified that this would not prevent 
retrials, and Lieutenant Governor Knight immediately announced that he 
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would ―prosecute[ the cases] to their conclusion.‖195 
Meanwhile, organizations supporting the Scottsboro defense effort were 
beginning to quell their intramural divisions.  After the Communist 
International in 1935 decided to support a popular front with liberal 
organizations against the ―towering menace of fascism,‖ the ILD ceased 
attacking NAACP leaders as ―capitalist lackeys‖ and agreed to share control of 
the Scottsboro retrials.
196
  The ILD, the NAACP, the ACLU, and other 
organizations now formed the Scottsboro Defense Committee (SDC), which 
orchestrated the defense for the next round of trials, relegated Leibowitz to the 
background, and enlisted a respected white lawyer from the South to do most 
of the courtroom work.  For the first time, some Alabama moderates were 
willing to form a state Scottsboro committee, but they resisted affiliating with 
Leibowitz, whose ILD connections and intemperate remarks had thoroughly 
alienated white Alabamians, and they wanted the ILD muzzled.  Even if these 
conditions were satisfied, most of them were not willing to commit themselves 
publicly on the defendants‘ guilt or innocence, and some of them insisted that 
the defendants accept compromise prison sentences.  The Alabama Scottsboro 
Fair Trial Committee that they formed accomplished little—most notably, 
failing in efforts to secure a new trial judge and prosecutor.
197
 
Late in 1935, a new grand jury in Jackson County, consisting of thirteen 
whites and one black, returned another indictment against all nine of the 
defendants.  (Alabama law required agreement by only a two-thirds 
supermajority of the grand jury to return an indictment.)  Early in 1936, 
Patterson was retried.  Twelve blacks appeared on the hundred-person venire 
from which his trial jury was drawn, but actually getting blacks to serve was 
another matter.  Seven of the prospective black jurors were excused at their 
own request—―looking anything but regretful‖ as they left the courthouse, 
according to one newspaper reporter.
198
  The prosecutor used peremptory 
challenges to strike the other five blacks from the jury.  Many whites on the 
venire admitted that they believed blacks were biologically inferior, but Judge 
Callahan refused to strike them for that reason.
199
 
At the trial, the state concocted new evidence against Patterson, producing 
a prison guard who testified to a supposed confession he had made.  Although 
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the defense demonstrated that it was almost certainly a fabrication, Callahan 
admitted the confession into evidence.  He also obstructed defense counsel at 
every turn, failed to disguise his irritation with them, and glared at Patterson 
while defining the crime of rape.  One prosecutor informed jurors of their duty 
to ―protect the fair womanhood of this great State‖200 and reminded them that 
after returning a verdict they would have to go home and face their 
neighbors.
201
 
Observers were shocked when the jury imposed only a seventy-five-year 
prison sentence on Patterson.  A Birmingham newspaper called this ―probably 
the first time in the history of the South that a Negro has been convicted of a 
charge of rape upon a white woman and has been given less than a death 
sentence.‖202  The jury foreman reported that he had been convinced of 
Patterson‘s innocence, but his colleagues had felt that an acquittal would 
effectively banish them from their communities; the lengthy prison sentence 
was a compromise.
203
 
Soon after Patterson‘s conviction, three of the Scottsboro defendants—
Norris, Powell, and Roy Wright—were in a car returning them to the 
Birmingham jail when Powell slashed a sheriff with a knife and then was 
himself shot in the head (though not fatally).  Whether Powell had been 
provoked was disputed, though the stabbing was not.  Northern newspapers 
tended to doubt the veracity of the sheriff‘s account that the shooting was in 
self-defense.
204
 
By 1936, Alabama officials, reflecting growing public weariness over the 
Scottsboro episode, began hinting at a compromise on sentences less than 
death.  The SDC was reluctant to have the defendants plead guilty to crimes 
they had not committed, but some members worried that the grounds for 
federal appeals were disappearing and that refusing to compromise could lead 
to more death sentences.  A deal was negotiated under which some of the 
defendants would be released immediately, while others would be prosecuted 
only for assault and receive sentences of less than five years in prison.  By the 
summer of 1937, editorial opinion in Alabama both supported and predicted a 
compromise solution.  But Judge Callahan blocked it, insisting that the 
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defendants be retried in his courtroom.
205
 
Norris went on trial again in Decatur in the summer of 1937, and the jury 
returned another death sentence.  Enlightened public opinion, as reflected in 
newspaper editorials urging a compromise, apparently went unrepresented on 
Morgan County juries.  The prosecutor now hinted that with the convictions 
of the two ―ringleaders of the crime‖—Patterson and Norris—the state was 
prepared to compromise.
206
  Andy Wright was the next defendant to be 
retried, and the state did not even seek the death penalty.  The prosecutor 
delivered an impassioned attack on New York City, and the jury imposed a 
ninety-nine-year prison sentence.  Next, Charley Weems was re-prosecuted, 
convicted, and sentenced to seventy-five years in prison.  The state then 
dropped the rape charges against Powell and charged him only with assaulting 
the deputy sheriff; he pled guilty and received a twenty-year sentence.  The 
state abandoned its cases against the other four defendants—the two youngest 
and the two most physically disabled at the time of the alleged rapes—and 
they were released.  One observer wryly noted that this resolution left 
Alabama in the ―anomalous position of providing only 50 per cent [sic] 
protection for the ‗flower of southern womanhood.‘‖207 
Newspapers outside of Alabama treated the dropping of charges against 
the four defendants as a virtual admission that all of the boys were innocent.  
Later in 1937, the Supreme Court, having exhausted all plausible grounds 
under the federal Constitution for reversing the Scottsboro defendants‘ 
convictions, declined to review Patterson‘s seventy-five-year prison sentence.  
The justices probably believed the boys were innocent, but that was not, 
unfortunately, a sufficient basis for reversing their convictions.
208
 
With grounds for judicial appeals evaporating, the SDC shifted its focus to 
securing a gubernatorial pardon.  Governor Graves agreed that Alabama could 
not justifiably continue to imprison some of the boys on evidence deemed 
insufficient to hold the others.  Late in 1937, he told the boys‘ representatives 
that he would release them before his term expired.  In the summer of 1938, 
after the Alabama Supreme Court had affirmed the death sentence of Norris 
and the prison sentences of the others, Graves commuted Norris‘s sentence to 
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life imprisonment.  Leading Alabama newspapers now supported clemency 
for the remaining prisoners, but the governor had a last-minute change of 
heart and reneged on his promise to free them.
209
 
Walter White then went to the White House to ask Eleanor Roosevelt to 
urge the president to intervene.
210
  President Roosevelt wrote to Graves, a 
political supporter, and urged him to pardon the remaining Scottsboro 
prisoners.  But the governor had tested the waters and concluded that 
releasing them would finish him politically.  This pattern of negotiated 
compromise followed by repudiation was repeated several times over the next 
eleven years.  Members of the parole board feared that if they recommended 
release, ―some candidate may seize upon it as an issue and endeavor to 
discredit the whole parole and probation system.‖211  Finally, in 1943–1944, 
three more of the Scottsboro prisoners were released.  But two of them 
promptly violated the terms of their parole by heading North in search of 
better employment opportunities, and the prison board threw them back in 
jail.  The last of the Scottsboro prisoners, Andy Wright, was not freed until 
1950.  The nine Scottsboro boys together spent more than 100 years in prison.  
Not until 1976 had the racial attitudes of whites in Alabama changed 
sufficiently for Governor George Wallace to issue an unconditional pardon to 
Norris, which effectively acknowledged his innocence.
212
 
IV.  LESSONS 
A.  Long-Term Ramifications 
The Supreme Court‘s interventions probably saved the Scottsboro boys 
from execution, though not from years of wrongful incarceration.  What were 
the broader consequences of these decisions for black criminal defendants in 
the South? 
Justice George Sutherland wrote a narrow opinion in Powell; not only did 
it cover only capital cases, but it was explicitly limited to the circumstances of 
the Scottsboro boys—―the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their 
youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the close 
surveillance of the defendants by the military forces.‖213  In 1942, the Court in 
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Betts v. Brady
214
 refused to extend Powell to all indigent felony defendants.  
However, several subsequent decisions held that under certain circumstances, 
such as a defendant‘s youth or low intelligence, state-appointed counsel is 
constitutionally required in felony prosecutions.  Most of these cases involved 
white defendants from northern states.  The facts were generally less 
egregious than those in Powell, and the justices usually divided.
215
 
Despite these extensions of Powell, the justices said almost nothing about 
the quality of defense representation the Constitution requires.  The one 
partial exception was Avery v. Alabama
216
 in 1940, where the Court ruled that 
an appointment of counsel three days before a capital murder trial began was 
permissible unless the defendant could show prejudice resulting from the 
shortness of time for trial preparation.  Thus, despite Powell and its progeny, 
southern blacks could be woefully underrepresented without there being a 
constitutional violation.  And so they were.  Because the value of most 
constitutional rights depends on having competent lawyers to raise them, 
southern blacks benefitted little from those rights to which they were 
entitled.
217
 
Most black criminal defendants in the South could not afford to hire their 
own lawyers, and thus their fates rested upon court-appointed counsel.  The 
NAACP financed a few cases that its lawyers considered likely to succeed.  
But the association rarely got involved in criminal litigation until after trial.  It 
had limited funds for such cases, and it did not regard itself as a legal aid 
bureau.  Thus, the NAACP‘s involvement was limited to cases where ―there is 
injustice because of race or color and where there is a possibility of 
establishing a precedent for the benefit of Negroes in general.‖218  These 
restrictive ground rules led the association to reject many cases of obvious 
racial injustice. 
Even the rare black defendant who could afford to hire a lawyer could not 
be certain that he was getting his money‘s worth.  Very few black lawyers 
practiced in the South in the 1930s or 1940s.  The number in Mississippi 
declined from twenty-one in 1910 to three in 1940, and the number in South 
Carolina fell from seventeen to five.
219
  Outside of major cities, there were 
essentially none.  Furthermore, the few black lawyers who did exist were a 
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distinct liability in most Jim Crow courtrooms, both because of the racial 
prejudice of white judges and jurors and because of the inferior legal training 
most of them had received (being barred from southern law schools).
220
 
Yet one might at least presume that black lawyers generally would have 
had the best interests of their clients at heart.  Black defendants never knew 
what they were getting with white lawyers.  To be sure, some white lawyers 
proved genuinely committed to serving their clients‘ interests and pursued 
cases without adequate compensation while risking reprisals for representing 
unpopular defendants.  But most white lawyers shared the prejudices of their 
communities, assumed their clients deserved whatever sentences they 
received, and barely went through the legal motions to collect a fee.
221
 
Willie Francis, a sixteen-year-old Louisiana black who was sentenced to 
death for murdering a white man, was victimized by this sort of inept 
lawyering.  Francis achieved national prominence in 1946–1947 when 
Louisiana sought to execute him ―by installments‖222 after the electric chair 
malfunctioned during the initial execution attempt.  At trial, Francis‘s two 
court-appointed lawyers had failed to challenge the all-white jury or to file a 
change-of-venue motion, even though Francis had been transferred to another 
county‘s jail to protect him from threatened mob violence.  Defense counsel 
also failed to object to Francis‘s possibly coerced confession, which was the 
only direct evidence linking him to the crime.  His lawyers made no opening 
argument, called no witnesses, and neglected to inform the jury that the police 
had ―lost‖ the alleged murder weapon.  Then they failed even to appeal 
Francis‘s conviction, thus forfeiting any valid constitutional claims he may 
have had.  Francis may have been innocent of the charge of murder, yet no 
appellate court ever scrutinized his trial record.  His case was unique, 
however, not because of this inept lawyering—which was all too common in 
the trials of indigent southern blacks—but because of the bungled execution 
attempt.  In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5–4 vote, rejected Francis‘s 
claim that a second execution attempt would constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment or violate due process.
223
  The justices did not even consider 
whether his trial representation had been adequate.
224
 
White lawyers risked severe social sanctions for defending black clients 
too vigorously when local communities were demanding blood.  Most chose 
not to do so.  Sonny Dobbs, a black man charged with murdering a white man 
 
220. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 156, 271. 
221. Id. at 271–72. 
222. See generally ARTHUR S. MILLER & JEFFREY H. BOWMAN, DEATH BY INSTALLMENTS: 
THE ORDEAL OF WILLIE FRANCIS (1988). 
223. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 460–66 (1947). 
224. MILLER & BOWMAN, DEATH BY INSTALLMENTS, supra note 222, at 23–27; KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 272.  
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in Attala County, Mississippi, in 1946, was defended by court-appointed 
whites, whom the NAACP thought did an excellent job under the 
circumstances.
225
  Still, they ―lived in Mississippi and wanted to stay 
[t]here‖226 and thus dared not take the measures that were essential to an 
effective defense, such as demanding a change of venue or challenging race 
discrimination in jury selection.  White lawyers who refused to capitulate to 
such pressure found their legal practices crippled, and sometimes they 
suffered physical violence.  In 1939–1940, Joseph Murray ably represented 
two blacks from McCormick, South Carolina, who were accused of murder—
probably falsely.  As a result, Murray reported that he had ―incurred the ill 
will of so many people here that I am now unable to secure any practice and it 
looks as if I might have to move to some other place and begin over to try and 
again build up a practice.‖227  Stanley Belden, a white ACLU lawyer who in 
1941 conscientiously represented a black man facing possibly trumped-up 
murder charges in Hugo, Oklahoma, saw his legal practice ruined and was 
forced to leave the state.
228
 
Southern courts refused to extend Powell to require effective 
representation of indigent defendants.  The justices had ruled that appointment 
of counsel on the morning of trial was inadequate, so southern judges would 
appoint lawyers a few days before trial.  Black defendants whose lives were in 
jeopardy were routinely provided lawyers so near to trial that no serious 
investigation of facts or preparation of trial strategy was possible.
229
  In the 
most explosive cases, moreover, court-appointed lawyers were strongly 
 
225. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 273. 
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Hughes, Stone, and Vinson Courts, 1936–1949, 90 VA. L. REV. 387 (2004). 
229. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447–53 (1940) (appointment three days before trial was 
sustained by the Supreme Court); McGee v. State, 26 So. 2d 680, 681 (Miss. 1946) (lawyer 
appointed three days before trial); MILLER & BOWMAN, DEATH BY INSTALLMENTS, supra note 222, 
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James H. Kimmel, Jr., Attorney, to NAACP (Dec. 2, 1941), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra 
note 17, at pt. 8, series B, reel 1, frames 749–50 (noting Kimmel‘s appointment as Oscar Beachem‘s 
lawyer the day before Beachem‘s trial); Memorandum from Roy Wilkins, Editor, CRISIS, to Walter 
White, Secretary, NAACP (Feb. 26, 1940), microformed on NAACP Papers, supra note 17, at pt. 8, 
series B, reel 2, frame 305 (discussing a case of four black boys whose lawyer was appointed seven 
days before their murder trial). 
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discouraged from seeking continuances by threats to lynch their clients.
230
  
Lawyers who persevered against such pressure generally saw their motions 
for continuances denied anyway, or else judges granted much shorter delays 
than they had sought.
231
 
Placing blacks on southern juries probably would have benefitted black 
defendants more than ensuring adequate representation of defense counsel 
would have.  This is why contemporary observers believed the jury-
discrimination claim of the Scottsboro defendants was more significant than 
their right-to-counsel argument.
232
  Yet, in practice, Norris had little impact on 
black jury service in the South. 
Southern newspapers predicted that Norris would be easily circumvented.  
The Jackson (Mississippi) Daily News deemed the decision only a minor 
nuisance because lawyers would have to invest time in evading it.
233
  In states 
such as Mississippi and South Carolina, where jury service was linked to 
voter registration, Norris made little if any difference because blacks 
remained almost universally disfranchised in the 1930s.
234
  Norris also left 
open the possibility of using jury-selection schemes that vested enormous 
discretion in the hands of (white) jury commissioners.  Proving race 
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discrimination in the administration of such schemes was difficult, especially 
because state courts still made the initial factual determinations.
235
 
Southern whites correctly concluded that Norris could be circumvented by 
placing the names of a few blacks on the jury rolls.  Such blacks were often 
superannuated, dead, disabled, or departed, and they never appeared in 
numbers approximating the percentage of a county‘s black population.236  
Even those blacks making it onto the rolls were rarely called for service, and 
if they were, they could often be intimidated.
237
  When a black college 
president in Texas refused to be excused from jury service in 1938, white 
hoodlums removed him from the jury room and threw him head first down the 
steps of a Dallas courthouse.
238
  Moreover, the presence of an occasional 
black on a grand jury could be nullified by rules requiring only a 
supermajority, not unanimity, for indictment.
239
  The even more occasional 
black called for service on trial juries could be excluded through challenges 
for cause, over which trial judges exercised enormous discretion, or through 
prosecutors‘ peremptory challenges, the number of which some states 
increased after Norris.
240
 
The most that Norris seems to have accomplished was to place a single 
black on an occasional jury in large cities of the peripheral South.
241
  In the 
Deep South and in rural areas throughout the region, exclusion of blacks from 
juries remained the rule.  In a Louisiana case that reached the Supreme Court 
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in 1939, a rural parish with a black population of nearly 50% had ―complied‖ 
with Norris by placing the names of three blacks, one of whom was dead, on a 
jury venire of 300.
242
  A study conducted in 1940 found that the vast majority 
of rural counties in the Deep South ―have made no pretense of putting 
Negroes on jury lists, much less calling or using them in trials.‖243 
Because southern states reformed their jury-selection practices so little 
after Norris, the justices continued to find easy cases for reversing convictions 
on the ground of race discrimination in jury selection.
244
  By the late 1940s, 
they were growing frustrated at the inefficacy of their decisions,
245
 but they 
still declined to take the steps necessary actually to place blacks on southern 
juries.  The Court refused to condemn the practices of limiting jury service to 
registered voters
246
 or of conferring virtually unfettered discretion over jury 
selection to commissioners.
247
  The Court did not even flatly prohibit the 
insidious practice of commissioners limiting prospective jurors to their 
personal acquaintances—meaning white people.248  In Akins v. Texas249 in 
1945, the Court inexplicably deferred to a state court‘s finding that there had 
been no race discrimination in jury selection despite the testimony of all three 
jury commissioners that they had refused to permit more than one black to sit 
on Akins‘s grand jury.  The justices declined even to hear a case contesting 
the constitutionality of prosecutors using peremptory challenges to exclude 
blacks from juries because of their race.
250
  As a result, southern juries 
remained almost entirely white for another generation.  Every one of the 
fifteen black men executed by the border state of Kentucky between 1940 and 
1962 had been convicted of a crime against a white person by an all-white 
jury.
251
 
The famous Martinsville Seven case illustrates how the exclusion of 
blacks from jury service invited racial injustice.  Seven young black men were 
charged with raping a white woman in the Southside region of Virginia in 
1949.  The woman had indisputably been raped, and all seven defendants had 
indisputably engaged in forcible intercourse with her or been present as 
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accomplices.  No lynch mob attempted to execute the defendants, and the trial 
was conducted in a mob-free atmosphere.  The defendants were not beaten 
into confessing.  The trials did not occur until five months after the crime, and 
defense counsel was appointed four months before trial.  Both the judge and 
the prosecutor avoided references at trial to the defendants‘ race.  Three 
blacks sat on the grand jury that indicted the defendants, and blacks appeared 
in each of the jury pools for the six separate trials.  Although black 
newspapers and some radical journalists compared these proceedings to those 
at Scottsboro twenty years earlier, the dissimilarities are actually more 
striking: The Martinsville Seven had real trials with real lawyers that were 
conducted with relative dispassion before a fair judge.
252
 
Yet the trials, convictions, and executions of the Martinsville Seven were 
fundamentally unjust for two reasons having to do with race.  First, although 
blacks were in the jury pools for all of the defendants‘ trials, every one of the 
seventy-two jurors who tried and convicted them was white.  Blacks were 
excluded from the juries because of their opposition to the death penalty or 
through the prosecutors‘ use of peremptory challenges.  Second, every one of 
the forty-five death sentences imposed for rape or attempted rape in Virginia 
between 1908 and 1950 involved a black man and a white woman.  
(Similarly, between 1925 and 1950, Florida executed thirty-three blacks and 
only one white for rape, and in its entire history Mississippi had executed no 
whites for rape.)
253
 
Thus, although the Martinsville Seven enjoyed ostensibly fair trials, their 
fate ultimately depended on their race.  In rape cases in Virginia, only blacks 
who assaulted whites ever received the death penalty, and only white jurors 
adjudicated their guilt and imposed sentences.  Oliver Hill, a black lawyer 
from Richmond who helped represent the Martinsville Seven, concluded that 
white Virginians knew that ―[w]e don‘t need to lynch the niggers.  We can try 
them and then hang them.‖254  Virginia executed the Martinsville Seven in 
February 1951—the largest mass execution or lynching for rape in American 
history.
255
 
Black jurors probably would have benefitted black defendants in other 
cases as well, assuming their independent judgment could have been 
guaranteed (quite possibly an unwarranted assumption in the South of this 
era).  Odell Waller was another black Virginian whose death sentence 
attracted national attention.  He was a sharecropper convicted of murdering a 
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2009] SCOTTSBORO 421 
white farmer, Oscar Davis, in Pittsylvania County, Virginia, in 1940.  Waller 
had undeniably killed Davis, but he had a plausible self-defense claim.  The 
two men had an unpleasant history, including Davis‘s mutilation of Waller‘s 
dog.  Immediately before Davis‘s death, they had quarreled over the 
distribution of crop shares.  Waller claimed that Davis was known to carry a 
gun and that he was reaching for it when Waller shot him.  The all-white jury 
rejected Waller‘s self-defense claim.  How could having blacks on Waller‘s 
jury—one-third of Pittsylvania County‘s population was black—not have 
made a difference?  When the race of the defendant and decedent were 
reversed in another sharecropper homicide case in Pittsylvania County around 
the same time, the all-white jury deliberated just fifteen minutes before 
acquitting the defendant, apparently crediting his self-defense claim.  Yet 
Governor Colgate Darden repulsed entreaties to commute Waller‘s death 
sentence, and he was executed in 1942.
256
 
Because most white men in the South presumed that sex between a black 
man and a white woman was rape, black defendants who pleaded consent as a 
defense to charges of raping white women had essentially no chance before 
all-white juries.  Even black defendants who pled mistaken identity might 
have benefitted from having blacks on their juries.  In 1935, a white 
Birmingham physician was quoted as saying that if a black man raped a white 
woman, ―an example and a spectacle of punishment‖ was necessary.  ―If 
possible get the right Negro and string him up.  String up one or two of his 
nearest relatives, at the same time.  And if the right one can‘t be found, take 
some other Negro.‖257  It seems safe to assume that all black jurors would 
have disagreed with that sentiment. 
B.  Why Powell and Norris Were So Inefficacious 
One reason decisions such as Powell and Norris had so little impact is that 
southern black defendants could not ordinarily appeal their convictions and 
sentences.  State appellate and federal judges were more likely than state trial 
judges to vindicate the constitutional rights of southern blacks because they 
were better educated, more professionalized, and more independent of local 
opinion that often proved hostile to those rights.  Yet cases of black criminal 
defendants usually did not proceed beyond trial courts, mainly because state 
provision of counsel to indigents did not generally extend to appeals, but also 
because procedural defaults frequently insulated trial errors from appellate 
 
256. SHERMAN, THE CASE OF ODELL WALLER AND VIRGINIA JUSTICE, supra note 231, at  
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review.
258
 
The criminal cases that reached the Supreme Court did so only because of 
outside financial assistance.  Incidents such as the racial massacre in Phillips 
County, Arkansas, and the alleged rapes and ensuing trials at Scottsboro 
captured national attention.  Because the criminal trials emerging from these 
incidents revealed Jim Crow at its worst, they afforded outstanding fund-
raising opportunities for the NAACP and the ILD, respectively.  However, the 
NAACP took relatively few criminal cases, and the association was absent 
from most of the rural South and thus could not intervene in cases at the 
moment when it would have done the most good—when the trial record was 
being created.  Thus, in run-of-the-mill criminal cases, indigent black 
defendants were represented not by elite legal talent hired by these 
organizations, but by court-appointed lawyers, who could not invariably be 
counted upon to aggressively defend their clients‘ rights because of the 
―personal odium‖ that attached to those challenging ―the venerable system‖ of 
white supremacy.
259
 
Furthermore, enlistment of competent counsel on appeal frequently came 
too late to do defendants much good, as inept or careless lawyering at trial 
produced procedural defaults that insulated constitutional violations from 
appellate review.  The issue of race discrimination in jury selection was 
procedurally defaulted in both Powell and in Moore (the Phillips County race-
riot case) and was very nearly so in Patterson.
260
  In Brown v. Mississippi,
261
 
the landmark decision in 1936 holding that criminal convictions based on 
coerced confessions violate due process, that issue nearly failed to gain a 
hearing in the Supreme Court because defense counsel had challenged the 
voluntariness of the confessions at the wrong point of the trial.  Until the 
Supreme Court in the 1960s changed the rules regarding federal court 
deference to state procedural defaults, many valid federal constitutional 
claims were denied a hearing in any appellate court.
262
 
The ruthlessness of the Jim Crow system made it difficult for lawyers to 
compile the sort of trial record necessary for effective appellate review.  Fear 
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of economic and physical reprisals deterred all but the most intrepid blacks 
from signing affidavits supporting a change in trial venue.
263
  When Walter 
White of the NAACP traveled to Phillips County to investigate the facts that 
gave rise to Moore, he was nearly lynched.
264
  One of the blacks whom 
Leibowitz had called to testify at the hearing challenging race discrimination 
in jury selection in Morgan County had a cross burnt on his front yard for 
―stepping out of line.‖265  Rigorous cross-examination of white witnesses, 
especially women in rape cases, not only alienated white jurors but also 
jeopardized the safety of defense counsel.
266
 
Finally, public officials in the South had little direct incentive to abide by 
the constitutional rights of black defendants because civil and criminal 
sanctions for violations were generally unavailable.  After Screws v. United 
States
267
 in 1945, it was far from certain whether the justices would permit the 
imposition of federal criminal liability even on sheriffs who beat defendants 
into confessing.
268
  Nor was it clear in the 1940s that courts would construe 
federal civil rights statutes to authorize the imposition of monetary liability on 
public officers who contravened state law as well as the federal 
Constitution,
269
 and every state already required the appointment of counsel 
for indigent capital defendants and forbade race discrimination in jury 
selection.
270
 
For all these reasons—the inability of most southern black defendants to 
afford counsel, the relative absence of alternative sources of legal assistance 
such as the NAACP, the difficulty of maneuvering around state procedural 
default rules, the obstacles to compiling a favorable trial record, and the 
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absence of effective sanctions against rights violators—few criminal cases 
like Powell and Norris reached the Court.  As one black newspaper observed 
after Powell, ―Out of the thousands of cases where Negroes are convicted 
without fair trials few ever reach the [S]upreme [C]ourt, and even if they do 
the results are rarely altered. . . .  We are afraid it will take more than 
decisions of the Supreme [C]ourt to rectify these flagrant evils of our judicial 
system.‖271 
C.  Intangible Benefits of Litigation 
Litigation in defense of the rights of southern blacks may have been more 
important for its intangible effects: convincing blacks that the racial status quo 
was malleable, educating them about their rights, helping to mobilize protest, 
and instructing northern whites about the barbarities of Jim Crow.  A social 
movement for racial reform faced intimidating obstacles in the South.  One of 
the most formidable was simply convincing blacks that the status quo of racial 
subordination was contingent rather than inevitable.  As Walter White 
observed, the NAACP‘s greatest difficulty was ―getting over to the masses of 
our folks the significance of these fights.‖272 
In theory, black protest could have assumed a variety of forms: migration, 
violent revolt, political mobilization, economic pressure, street 
demonstrations, or litigation.  In practice, however, options were limited.  
Violent protest would have been suicidal, given overwhelming white physical 
power and the will to use it.  Political protest was unavailable to southern 
blacks, who remained almost universally disfranchised.  Few southern blacks 
commanded sufficient financial resources to leverage social change through 
economic pressure.  Street demonstrations, which proved so effective in the 
1960s, were not yet a realistic option: The South was still too violent, 
segregation and disfranchisement too deeply entrenched, and the threat of 
national intervention too remote.  As one black leader observed, no doubt 
correctly, a Gandhian strategy of nonviolent protest in the South would have 
led to ―an unprecedented massacre of defenseless black men and women.‖273  
Only two protest options were realistically available to southern blacks before 
World War II: migration and litigation.  Many hundreds of thousands pursued 
the former; far fewer chose the latter. 
Most civil rights leaders appreciated the limited transformative potential 
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of litigation given prevailing constraints.  Charles Houston, the principal legal 
strategist of the NAACP in the 1930s, recognized that law ―has certain 
definite limitations when it comes to changing the mores of a community,‖ 
because ―[i]t is too much to expect the court to go against the established and 
crystallized social customs.‖274  Yet even if litigation could not ―bring on a 
social revolution,‖ as Ralph Bunche observed,275 it could advance long-term 
objectives.  Litigation educated blacks about their rights and inspired them to 
challenge the racial status quo.  The NAACP‘s national office wrote letters to 
southern blacks explaining their rights and the obligation of whites to respect 
them.  Some black communities in the South felt so hopeless and isolated that 
for the national office merely to make inquiries on their behalf would ―do a lot 
of good.‖276  A memorandum by Houston declared that a principal objective 
of litigation should be ―to arouse and strengthen the will of local communities 
to demand and fight for their rights.‖277 
Houston and his successor at the NAACP, Thurgood Marshall, thought 
that organizing local communities in support of litigation was nearly as 
important as winning lawsuits.  They frequently made speeches at mass rallies 
while visiting southern communities for court appearances.  ―On occasion,‖ 
one biographer writes, Marshall ―appears to have been brought to town 
nominally to work on pending litigation but actually to rally the troops.‖278  
Perceiving the need ―to back up our legal efforts with the required public 
support and social force,‖ Houston referred to himself as ―not only lawyer but 
evangelist and stump speaker.‖279  Because cases arising from episodes such 
as Scottsboro demonstrated to blacks the importance of binding together in 
self-defense, they provided unparalleled fund-raising and branch-building 
opportunities for the NAACP.  As one black editorialist observed, ―Whatever 
else happens in the Scottsboro case, . . . [i]t has given us one of the greatest 
chances for consolidated action we have had since emancipation.‖280 
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Litigation also provided southern black communities with salutary 
examples of the accomplishments and courage of black Americans.  Watching 
a skilled black lawyer subject a white sheriff to a grueling cross-examination 
educated and inspired southern blacks, who virtually never witnessed such 
scenes of blacks confronting whites on an equal footing.
281
  Bold and capable 
performances by black lawyers in southern courtrooms seemed to contravene 
the very premises of white supremacy. 
Marshall explained this dynamic in connection with a criminal trial in 
Hugo, Oklahoma, in 1941, where no black lawyer had ever before appeared in 
the courtroom.  Marshall and his white co-counsel, Stanley Belden of the 
ACLU, had agreed that Marshall would cross-examine all of the police 
officers on the issue of whether the defendant‘s confession had been coerced, 
―because we figured they would resent being questioned by a Negro and 
would get angry and this would help us.  It worked perfect.  They all became 
angry at the idea of a Negro pushing them into tight corners and making their 
lies so obvious.‖282  Marshall continued: 
Boy, did I like that—and did the Negroes in the Court-room 
like it.  You can‘t imagine what it means to those people 
down there who have been pushed around for years to know 
that there is an organization that will help them.  They are 
really ready to do their part now.  They are ready for 
anything.
283
 
Litigation may also have raised the salience of the race issue for whites.  
Houston acknowledged that ―[t]he truth is there are millions of white people 
who have no real knowledge of the Negro‘s problems and who never give the 
Negro a serious thought.‖284  As Bunche noted, ―[c]ourt decisions, favorable 
or unfavorable, serve to dramatize the plight of the race more effectively than 
any other recourse; their propaganda and educative value is great.‖285  
Criminal cases may have afforded the best educational opportunities 
available, as they revealed Jim Crow at its worst—southern blacks, possibly 
or certainly innocent of the crimes charged, being railroaded to the death 
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penalty through farcical trials.  As one black newspaper observed, ―No single 
event touching the Negro question in this country has been forced into the 
conscience, the life and the public opinion of the American people as has the 
Scottsboro case.‖286 
Finally, litigation, when successful, provided blacks with one of their few 
reasons for optimism before World War II.  As one black leader observed in 
1935, even if court victories produced little concrete change, at least they 
―keep open the door of hope to the Negro.‖287  Roscoe Dunjee, the NAACP‘s 
principal agent in Oklahoma, noted after one such court victory, ―It is just 
such rifts in the dark clouds of prejudice which cause black folk to know that 
a better day is coming by and by.‖288 
D.  Intangible Harms of Litigation Victories 
Rulings such as Powell and Norris may have produced intangible harms 
as well as benefits.  By 1950 or so, lynchings were nearly obsolete in the 
South, and legal lynchings had been tempered and confined to narrower 
portions of the Deep South.  Yet nowhere in the South did blacks serve as 
jurors in inflammatory cases of alleged black-on-white crime.  All-white 
juries applied unwritten substantive liability rules decreeing that only black 
men could be executed for raping white women and only whites were 
permitted to kill other whites in self-defense.  Criminal justice outside of the 
Deep South may have acquired a veneer of legitimacy by the 1940s.  The 
justices could find no constitutional error in cases such as those of the 
Martinsville Seven or that of Odell Waller because the trials had ostensibly 
been fair.  Yet black men were still being executed under circumstances 
where whites almost surely would not have been.
289
 
Given this state of affairs, one may wonder whether the Court‘s criminal 
interventions did not have insidious consequences.  In landmark decisions 
protecting the rights of southern black defendants, the justices employed some 
of their grandest rhetoric about the high court‘s heroic role in defending 
unpopular minorities from majoritarian oppression.  For example, in 1940 in 
Chambers v. Florida,
290
 which extended Brown v. Mississippi‘s bar on 
coerced confessions to cover interrogation practices other than physical 
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violence, the Court proudly proclaimed the obligation of judges to ―stand 
against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might 
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because 
they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.‖291  
Newspapers reported the decision in banner headlines such as, ―Justices 
Rededicate Themselves as a Haven of Refuge for all Non-Conforming 
Victims of Public Prejudice.‖292  A glowing editorial in the Nation quoted 
some of the Court‘s rhetoric and basked in the happy ending of Chambers: 
Americans were to ―be proud‖ because the Court had freed ―obscure and 
humble‖ black men who implicated no larger political or economic 
concerns.
293
 
Yet Chambers apparently had little effect on southern sheriffs, who 
continued to coerce confessions from black suspects.
294
  Nor, as we have seen, 
did rulings such as Powell and Norris significantly alter Jim Crow justice.  
Were blacks clearly better off because of rulings that had little practical 
consequence for southern criminal justice but that enabled the Court to 
trumpet the vigilant defense that judges offered against racial prejudice in 
law?  Before the Court‘s interventions, at least everyone could see mob-
dominated trials for what they were—farcical substitutes for lynchings.  After 
such rulings, however, casual observers might have been misled into 
believing, along with the New York Times, that ―the high court stands on 
guard with flaming sword over the rights of every one of us.‖295 
Blacks could be excused if they demurred from such sentiments.  Even in 
states such as Virginia, where the formal requirements of due process were 
more attentively observed, blacks did not sit on juries in racially explosive 
cases, and all-white juries applied informal liability rules that discriminated 
against blacks.  In the postwar period, the Court had opportunities to redress 
such injustices.  Defendants appealed to the Court cases that challenged the 
racially motivated use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors and racial 
disparities in the administration of the death penalty.  The justices refused 
even to grant review.
296
  Not until the 1970s would the Court invalidate the 
discriminatory administration of the death penalty,
297
 and not until the 1980s 
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would it forbid the race-conscious use of peremptory challenges.
298
  Yet the 
rhetoric of Chambers suggests that the justices believed they had already 
taken enormous strides toward eliminating race discrimination from southern 
criminal justice.  They had not.  Their accomplishments were fairly trivial—
more a change in form than in substance.  To the extent that the justices and 
their admirers were deluded into thinking otherwise, these criminal rulings 
may have caused actual harm to the interests of southern blacks.
299
 
The Court‘s refusal to review a case technically does not indicate approval 
of the lower court‘s decision (though it may imply this, given the justices‘ 
self-proclaimed role as heroic defender of minority rights).  Yet this Court did 
not simply fail to intervene against certain racial inequalities in the criminal 
justice system of the South; it actually affirmed unjust convictions.  In Akins 
v. Texas in 1945, each of the jury commissioners had admitted his intention to 
limit the number of blacks per grand jury to one, yet somehow the justices 
found the record unclear on this point.  Moreover, Akins had an especially 
compelling case for reversal of his murder conviction because his self-defense 
claim almost certainly would have prevailed had he been white.  Yet the 
justices affirmed his death sentence.
300
  Lyons v. Oklahoma
301
 in 1944 was the 
most atrocious coerced confession case since Brown v. Mississippi; the record 
contained convincing testimony by several whites that Lyons, a black man, 
had been savagely beaten with a blackjack for several hours in an effort to 
obtain his confession.
302
  Lyons, too, had a strong claim of innocence.  Yet the 
justices decided to defer to the jury‘s determination that Lyons‘s second 
confession, obtained just twelve hours after his brutal beatings had ended, was 
voluntary.  For anyone convinced by the Chambers rhetoric, the force of the 
claims by Lyons and Akins that they had been unjustly treated was necessarily 
diminished.  A Court serving as a ―haven[] of refuge for . . . [the] helpless, 
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weak, . . . or . . . non-conforming victims of prejudice‖303 would surely have 
intervened on behalf of these defendants had their claims been meritorious.  
But their claims were meritorious.  By affirming their convictions, the Court 
probably helped legitimize the unjust treatment of black criminal defendants. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It was no accident that modern American criminal procedure was born in 
cases involving southern black defendants.  For the Supreme Court to begin 
seriously monitoring the state criminal process required a departure from 150 
years‘ worth of tradition and legal precedent grounded in federalism concerns.  
The justices were not prepared to take that step in cases of marginal 
unfairness, but only where the trial had been a complete sham.  Such legal 
travesties occurred most frequently in the South in cases involving black 
defendants charged with interracial rape or murder. 
The state-imposed death penalty in such cases was little more than a 
formalization of the lynching process.  The purpose of a mob-dominated trial 
was simply to avoid a lynching, and the purpose of a lynching was as much to 
ensure black subordination as it was to punish guilt.  The southern appellate 
courts and the U.S. Supreme Court applied different paradigms when 
reviewing such trials.  Southern courts saw praiseworthy progress in the mere 
avoidance of lynchings.  By contrast, Supreme Court justices expected 
criminal trials to be about adjudicating guilt or innocence, not simply 
preempting a lynching. 
The trials in such cases were so egregiously unfair that national public 
opinion probably endorsed the Court‘s interventions.  Even within the South, 
these rulings had many supporters, as they simply bound southern states to 
behavioral norms that they usually had embraced on their own.  Thus, these 
early criminal procedure rulings probably do not represent the sort of 
countermajoritarian judicial decision making one often associates with 
landmark decisions such as Mapp
304
 or Miranda
305
; it is more accurate to see 
them as the Court imposing a national consensus on recalcitrant outliers.  
Indeed, southern state courts themselves might have rectified the obvious 
injustices involved in these cases had the circumstances been slightly 
different.  In the early decades of the twentieth century, southern courts had 
become more committed to procedural fairness, even in cases involving black 
defendants charged with serious interracial crimes.  Yet in cases that 
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generated outside criticism of the South or that were perceived to pose 
broader challenges to white supremacy, southern appellate courts regressed.  
Cases that might otherwise not have reached the U.S. Supreme Court slipped 
through the state system uncorrected and thus provided the occasion for 
landmark criminal procedure rulings. 
Considered against the backdrop of the Court‘s other contemporaneous 
race decisions, these early criminal procedure rulings demonstrate that not all 
Jim Crow measures were of a piece.  During this era, the Court unanimously 
affirmed the constitutionality of public school segregation,
306
 the white 
primary,
307
 and the poll tax.
308
  The justices apparently thought it was one 
thing to segregate and disfranchise blacks and quite another to execute 
possibly innocent blacks after farcical trials. 
Finally, evaluating the consequences of decisions such as Powell and 
Norris is complicated.  The Court probably saved the lives of the Scottsboro 
boys, but it could not protect them from unjust prison sentences.  The more 
the Court intervened on their behalf, the more determined white Alabamians 
seemed to punish them.  Thus, despite two Supreme Court rulings in their 
favor, the Scottsboro boys each served from five to twenty years in prison for 
crimes they did not commit. 
In terms of broader effects, the rulings proved disappointing.  The quality 
of defense representation for indigent southern blacks did not significantly 
improve as a result of Powell, and few if any blacks sat on southern juries as a 
result of Norris.  The litigation producing these and other decisions may have 
had intangible benefits for the civil rights movement: teaching blacks about 
their rights, convincing them that racial change was possible, helping them to 
organize, and educating whites about the atrocities of Jim Crow.  But by 
implying that the Court had effected meaningful changes in southern criminal 
justice when in fact it had not done so, decisions such as Powell and Norris 
may also have harmed southern blacks by lending legitimacy to a system that 
remained deeply oppressive. 
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